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ABSTRACT

^®^isionist Criticism of John D6wey*s
Theory of Schooling
September, 1980

Donald Henry Benander, A.B., Harvard University
Ed. D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Louis Fischer

This dissertation shows that criticism of John Dewey by the
^3'dical revisionists, Clarence Karier, Walter Feinberg, Samuel Bowles,

and Herbert Gintis, is based upon a misunderstanding of Dewey's

social philosophy.

In their criticism, founded upon the "new history"

of the late 1960s and 1970s, they rely upon a version of liberalism

that was typical of the 1940s and 1950s.

They fail to recognize the

ways in which Dewey, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, espoused a

version of liberalism that included the social reconstructionists and

many of the radicals of that time.

While it may be true that many of

the spokesmen of liberalism contemporary with Dewey held the

same

lalssez faire views which the radical revisionists criticize, Dewey

himself shared many of their radical beliefs.
The dissertation examines the specific criticisms made of

Dewey by the authors mentioned.

It identifies the major elements

of philosophy or ideology in which both Dewey and the revisionists

are writing, and assesses the 'problems of modern liberalism which the

iv

revisionists are legitimately addressing.

The conclusion of the

dissertation is that while the revisionists have raised pertinent
objections to liberalism in general, they have misrepresented many
of Dewey’s views and have overlooked important elements of a

constructive social philosophy that were central to his work.
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CHAPTER

I

THE BEGINNINGS OF RADICAL CRITICISM
OF DEWEY AND SCHOOLING

The Origin of Revisionism In the Progressive Education Movement
The Progressive Education Movement, in the view of Lawrence
Cremin, represented people with a diverse collection of views,

including the radical reformers of Dewey’s time, as well as their
opponents.

The rise and decline of the movement, with its internal

factions, encompassed both the views of Dewey and those radicals who

challenged his educational and social theories.

In his survey of

Progressivism Cremin maintains that although the movement began as one
of protest, its character changed to reform.

three distinguishable concerns:

The reform phase had

child centered education, social

reform, and adoption of scientific measurement and testing.

By 1950

in the conservative reaction after World War II, the movement collapsed

from the break-up of the political coalition that had supported it.
In the Genius of American Education Cremin argued that

Ptogr essivism failed because the locus of control of education had

moved out of the schools into other institutions such as the mass
media, where attitudes and values of the young were being more

forcefully formed.

The free school movement, he said, was a revival

earlier concerns,
of Progressivism, related to the first two of the
reform, but not scientific
i.e., child centered education and social

measurement and testing.
1

2

A.

S.

Neill’s Summerhill, the first of the free school

publications, was published in 1960 but received little attention at
first.

In the mid 1960s writings of John Holt, Herbert Kohl, George

Dennison, James Herndon, and Jonathan Kozol added fuel to the fire of

criticism of public schools.

With these writers, the free school

movement took shape as a coalition of diverse interests.

It closely

united the black and ethnic groups seeking economic and political

self-determination with a white, middle-class, group which was more
apolitical.

Cremin cites the early issues of the quarterly Socialist

Revolution

as blending the concerns for child centered education and

schools as a lever for radical social change.

^

Although the free school movement itself was not known for its
radical politics, some elements of it, particularly minority groups,
turned to confrontation methods.

At the same time, writers like

Ivan Illich extended the earlier literature critical of public

schooling to call for the abolition of all schooling.

The radical

revisionists, therefore, may be see to have some historical connection
to the free school movement.

The concern for school as a lever for social change, Cremin
educators.
notes, had changed from the time of the Progressive

Then

public schools, and
it was the conservatives who wanted to abolish

radicals who supported public schooling.

With the work of writers

abolition of public
like Ivan Illich radicals began calling for
schooling.

3

Radical Revisionists
The group known as the radical revisionists began
with the

publication of Michael Katz's The Irony of Early School Reform
(1968)

which received wide attention for Its attempt to frame research
questions In terms of the possibility that crucial decisions In
shaping of the Institutional structures of education may have been

made by elite political groups.
Other historians pursued this line of Interpretation as Illustrated by

Clarence Karler's collection of articles In Roots of

Crisis (1972), Colin Greer's The Great School Legend (1972), and
Joel Spring's Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (1972).

Building on the work of the revisionist historians, writers from
other disciplines who shared the political outlook continued the

criticism of the liberal view of schooling.

Walter Felnberg, an

educational philosopher, wrote Reason and Rhetoric; The Intellectual

Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy (1975),
examining the philosophical problems of the liberal educators and

critiquing their philosophical assumptions.

Samuel Bowles and

Herbert Glntls, radical economists, relying on the historical

work of Michael Katz, wrote Schooling In Capitalist America (1976),
examining the economic basis of public education In training labor
for the economic sector.

The response to revisionist history was vigorous.

On the

one hand a number of historians who were sympathetic to the social

A

concerns of revisionism or who tried to remain ideologically neutral,
produced several works focusing on urban education: Marvin Lazerson,
The Origin of Urban Schools (1971), Karl Kaestle, The Historical

Evolution of the Urban School (1973)
System (1974)

.

,

and David Tyack, The One Best

On the other hand some historians opposed the

revisionists, and wrote from a point of view more sympathetic to

traditional liberalism.

Diane Ravitch wrote The Great School Wars of

New York: 1805-1973 (1974)
Transformation

,

and Lawrence Cremin

of the School (1972).

wrote The

Rush Welter had written

Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America (1962)

,

and

continued to write reviews critical of the revisionists.
Some of the revisionists, particularly, Karier, Feinberg,

and Bowles and Gintis, traced the criticism they had of liberal views
of school to the works of John Dewey.

political liberalism
of education.

Dewey was a major figure of

in America, and a key figure in the philosophy

Since Progressive Education was the dominant movement

in education in the early half of this century, and Dewey was

associated with it, they argued that the problems with the schools
today should be tracable to Dewey’s work.

While they acknowledged that the connection between Dewey
and liberalism
so simply,

and current problems in schooling cannot be stated

They believed that there was something wrong with saying

the result of the
that the present difficulties of the schools were
that Dewey had
failure of educators to live up to the high standards
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set for liberal education.

Their explanation

took, two

directions.

The first was to try to show that Dewey did teach that schools should
stress the exercise of authority by teachers and administrators, and
that he did try to legitimize the schools’ social control over students.

They argued that he did not have an adequate respect for democratic
procedure, or respect for the uneducated population.

He feared and

resented the growing immigrant population, they said, and its
threat to established authority, and viewed the schools as the

primary institution for socializing the lower class to prevent

revolutionary unrest.
The second tack the revisionists took in their critique of

Dewey was to say that even though many of his statements were in
favor of egalitarian ideals, his actions showed that his intent was

different.

The main evidence they used was a study Dewey wrote for

the War Department in 1918 on the Polish community in Philadelphia.

The revisionists argued that Dewey showed elitist intolerance of

minority rights in this report.

They also appealed to comments in

racist and
his private letters that suggested that he harbored

elitist personal views.
were the only
The revisionist writers chosen for this paper

work of Dewey in any:
ones who addressed their attention to the
extended way.

revisionist
They are, however, typical of the range of

attention on
liters, and their work has received public

comparable with their colleagues.

a scale

The chart shown in Table 1 is a

6

summary

indicating the number of times these authors have
been

,

cited in all the journals covered by The Social Sciences
Citation

Index

for the given years.

The numbers for Bowles and Gintls are

higher than the others since they publish in economics journals as

well as in educatioal literature.

From the table it is apparent that

the authors chosen for this paper are cited by their colleagues

at a

comparable level with some of the best known writers in the same
area in education, and that it was in the period of 1971 to 1975 that
their work received the most attention.

Issues of Revisionism
Some of the issues central to the revisionist critique are

summarized in Christopher Hum’s The Limits and Possibilities of

Schooling

.

Here it is suggested that the 1950s and 1960s were a

period of expansion both in funding and attendance in public schools.

As the schools began to feel the end of the expansion in the late
1960s and early 1970s, reformers' expectations were disappointed.

Particularly in the area of eradicating poverty, but also with
respect to reducing racial and ethnic segregation, large investments
in public schools could not be justified by measurable improvements.
ks a consequence, explanations for failure were sought in alternative

theories of schooling.

According to Hum, liberal theories of schooling, which he
calls "functional theories", are based on three assumptions.

The

first is what he calls the meritocratic principle, that achievement

Indejc
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in economic terms is and ought to be related to the talents of

individuals.

Ability and effort count for more than privilege and

inherited status.

While there is improvement that can yet be made

in this country, to a great extent we have achieved meritocracy.

Schools do identify individuals with talent, and these are the ones

who are in fact rewarded with status and prestige in economic terms.
The second principle is that since society requires

increasingly specialized skills, and relies on ever more sophisticated

application of information to diverse areas, schools must be responsible for training individuals with appropriate cognitive skills.

Schools not only increase the quantity of new information available
for use in economic enterprises, but train large numbers of people
in the basic cognitive skills as well as more limited numbers in the

more specialized skills.
The third principle of the functional model or "paradigm" of

liberal schooling is that society is moving toward increasingly

democratic and egalitarian social arrangements.

Education reduces

intolerance and prejudice, and creates support for expansion of civil
rights.

Citizens are more economically secure, and more able to

defend individual rights against authoritarian abuse.

Fulfillment

possible.
of individual aspirations is therefore increasingly
By way of contrast.

Hum

sees the revisionist views reflected

in what he calls the "radical paradigm."

On the basis of a number

predictions based on the functional
of studies that indicate that
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paradigm could not be sustained, the radicals suggest a different

model of society.

Rather than a functional model in which the

elements work together to achieve a harmonious integration, they suggest a conflict model in which various segments of society struggle

against one another to produce a precarious balance of forces. Rather
than view society

as progressing toward greater equality and demo-

cratic control, they see the politically dominant elites increasing
their autocratic control.

Capitalism characterizes the economic

system, exploiting the social order to bring poverty and unemployment,

and the natural order to bring ecological disaster.

Discrimination

in the form of racism and sexism are seen as integral to the control

exercised by capitalism, since the inculcation of prejudice helps

divide and conquer the working class.
The implication of the radical paradigm for schooling is that

present social conditions are not an example of the failure of
liberalism, but of its success.
ic

Schools are in the control of econom-

capitalist
forces and are used to perpetuate the control of the

elite.

The actual content of the curriculum is "hidden."

It is to

attitudes and
teach passivity, self-discipline, and submissive

behavior.

"good" work habits
Middle class morality, competition, and

and personal growth.
are used to subvert independent thought

A

genuine product of the educational
passive and compliant worker is the
system.

reinforce the inequality
Rather than promote reform, schools

already prevalent in the system.

The radical paradigm is a summary

of
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the revisionists’ general position on schooling.

Hum

presents these models as a framework to discuss a number

of sociological studies on schooling, and to indicate how the research

questions were framed in response to ideological presuppositions.

Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin present a similar view of the revisionist position from the point of view of educational economics. In their

work. The Limits of Educational Reform

,

their argument is that the

characteristic feature of liberal views of education is that reform
of the schools can have a significant effect on reform of larger

society.

Given the character of the economic system under which we

live, they say, there is little possibility that anything that the

educational system does can change the conditions of poverty or
economic inequality, since these problems are functions of the
economic system itself.
inequality.

Schools reflect rather than cause economic

Since reform must come by economic changes, those

reformers who believed that changes in the educational system would
be effective were at best naive, and in their practical effect,

misleading, since the result was not reform but support for the
established power of the economic elite.

While there is nothing wrong

with giving more and better schooling to the poor, it does not solve
of the
the problem of poverty, since it merely rotates the identity
of poor to rich.
group that is poor, without changing the relationship

capitalist system.
In fact, schools are an integrated part of the

11

The solution Carnoy and Levin propose is to change the

structure of work, and thereby to dismantle the system of capitalism.
At some points they suggest that a "sudden” change may be the best,
but the aim is to substitute participatory democratic procedures in
the workplace, and to allow education to make itself more democratic
in response to a new set of economic arrangements.

This is the

economic version of educational revisionism.

The only author who has dealt with the revisionists in

education in a full length book has been Diane Ravitch in her

Revisionists Revised

.

She distinguishes two revisionist trends in the

historiography of American education in the 1960s.

The first of these

revisionist trends examined the Progressive-liberal tradition in a

critical light, noting events and conditions that ran counter to the
accepted ideals.

Leaders of this group were Bernard Bailyn and

Lawrence Cremin.

She describes the second group as follows;

"The second trend, reflecting a growing impatience with
the pace of social change in the United States,
undertook not merely a reassessment of liberalism, but
Referred to as radical revisionism,
a repudiation of it.
it outspokenly declared its ideological and political
attachments, and relentlessly castigated Progressives
and liberals for reforming the American state without
fundamentally altering it." 2

Michael
She lists as the representatives of the radical revisionists:
Bowles,
Katz, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Colin Greer, Samuel

Herbert Gintis, and Walter Feinberg.

She views as the defining

and its
characteristic of revisionism a repudiation of liberalism

attitude toward public schooling.

Public schooling was an extension
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of the coercive power of the state, a sorting device undergirding the

exploitative class system, and a mechanism to reinforce discrimination
against various minorities.
Both revisionist trends have used new data sources for their

historical research, like computer analysis of population statistics,
and have emphasized the need to study the performance of educational

agencies as well as their rhetoric.

They have championed the interest

of the poor, and brought to light institutional bias toward various

While the first revisionist trend exposed the narrowness

minorities.

of educators' concern with schooling to the exclusion of the

educational effect of other social institutions, the radical

revisionists continued to be absorbed in the institutional history
like the older historians.

The clearest difference between the two

kinds of revisionists, however, says Ravitch, is in their ideology
and politics.

The radicals contend, that schools were consciously

designed to be undemocratic, and were intended to be instruments of
elitist social control.

To corroborate this conclusion, she quotes

Marvin Lazerson, who writes that the radical revisionists believe
"that our educational failures are neither accidental
nor mindless, but endemic, built into the system as part
For these historians, schools in
of its raison d'etre.
America have acted to retain the class structure by
molding the less favored to the dominant social order.
They are designed to repress blacks and other non-white
minorities while enhancing the growth of a professional
establishment." ^
finds
Ravitch identifies a number of themes that she

representative of the radical revisionists.

Schools in general reflect
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class differences, so that as an institution, schooling is the effort
of the middle class, or rich, to control the lower class, or poor.

Efforts to reform the schools or to expand schooling to include more
of the population were not aimed at equality, but at extending the

authority and control of the middle class.

It was similarly the case

with extension of schooling to immigrant populations.

The diversity

of cultural groups was seen to threaten the control of the white,

middle class, leaders.

The aim of schooling for immigrants was not

upward mobility, but assimilation to the lower ranks of the existing

While many of the immigrants accepted schooling as

economic order.

a means to economic advancement, they were misled by "The Great

School Legend."

The administration of public schools by bureaucracies

did not serve democratic ends, but efficiency in the interest of

elitist control.

The elite was a capitalist leadership who succeeded

in making the schools a training program for their own labor needs.

While Ravitch acknowledges that this view of schooling
has led to fruitful research in the history of education, she suggests
that revisionists share three "analytical devices

examination.

which need re

The first is a "sort of social and economic determinism."

events or
There is a tendency to draw conclusions about historical
of social class
characters on the basis of a theoretical interpretation

because Dewey and
An example of this may be Karier's suggestion that
his family derived a portion of their income

from investments in the

could be expected to regard the
stock market, he vas a capitalist and

1
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Polish-American community as a pool of cheap labor rather than as
citizens with civil rights that deserved protection.
A second analytic device which she Identifies is the idea that
there is an easy correlation between the effect of

original purpose.

a

policy and its

She calls this a type of functionalist sociology,

and suggests that such a method of analysis relieves the historian of
the need to show the connection between Intentions and outcomes even

though such a connection is most critically significant in historical
analysis.

If schools turned out to be oppressive,

for example, it is

assumed that those who originally created them Intended this result.
If

Dewey supported entry of the United States into the First World

War, and the result was a greater oppression of the poor in this

country by a new coalition of business and government, then Dewey

must have intended a kind of state capitalism, regardless of his
stated intentions.
The third device is the assumption of a parallelism of

structure and purpose in institutions.

If schools are organized

bureaucratically, the structure is meant to maximize control from the
top, and to minimize democratic political participation.

There is a

direct link between racial and ethnic discrimination and the

bureaucratic structure of schools.

While Ravitch admits that such

a congruence of purpose and structure may be true,

it is not

necessary, and indeed, poses the question to be answered, not the

15

solution.

Although committed to the democratic, liberal view, Ravitch
does see the work of the radical revisionists in the context of

larger issues that are as yet unresolved.

She rejects the revisionist

claim that upward social mobility is a myth in America, and that the
public schools have failed to deliver on their promise of economic

advancement.

Her conclusion is that there is evidence for the

reality of upward mobility, and that it is not clear exactly what
the relation of schooling is to it.

Nevertheless, she puts this

difference of opinion in the context of a discussion of equality
in more general terms.

She considers whether the radicals have not

set up an artificial contradiction between equal opportunity and

equal wealth.

She sees public policy as reflecting a concern for

both, and in so doing, accurately representing public attitudes.

She argues that too doctrinaire an emphasis on egalitarianism

leads to the sacrifice of other values that historically the public
has not been willing to make.

The objection traditionally raised

to redistribution of wealth has been that it would require the

kind of authoritarian control that most people, including the

revisionists, reject.

The need for constant monitoring and re-

eliminate
adjustment would entrench a bureaucratic class that would

private initiative and freedom.

On the other hand, it is not

damaging productivity.
clear how such equality could happen without
confidence in the public
Economic planning so far has not generated
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that it would not itself become another special interest, or
that it

could improve on present levels of productivity.

The revisionists'

contention, then, appears to be a one-sided solution that could upset
a present balance of Interests that is not in principle a bad one.

The revisionists have enriched the study of educational history

during the past fifteen years by their introduction of new methods
of historical research as well as by their radical Ideological

perspective.

Their provocative challenge to accepted views of

schooling and the policies used to direct the course of its development have generated a great deal of new research, as well as

controversy about principles and values.

It has led to a reconsider-

ation of the work of Dewey on educational philosophy and the role
of schooling, and brought to light the need for experimental

verification of the programs of liberalism.

It is in the interest

of a critical reappraisal of Dewey's work as an example of liberal

views of schooling that we now turn to the radical revisionists'

writing on this topic.

CHAPTER

II

CLARENCE KARIER;

DEWEY'S LIBERALISM AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Introduction

Karier's work is in the tradition of the History of Ideas. His

method is to identify alternative conceptual points of view or
"ideologies", and to interpret any given historical era as a balance,
if not a resolution, of the countervailing views under the influence

of the economic and political conditions of the times.

Man, Society, and Education (1967)
.

,

His book,

portrays American educational

history in the last century as an encounter between "classical
humanism" with its emphasis on the individual in a natural and
,

supernatural setting, and "humanitarianism"
social progress in a naturalist context.

,

with its emphasis on

Those whom Karier calls

Neo—Conservatices and Fascists took the views of humanism and adapted
them to an aggressive political program, while social reconstructionists
and Marxists did the same for the humanitarian ideology.

The present

state of affairs in education reflects this conflict.
account
The book itself ends only with Karier's descriptive

implication that some
of the two competing ideologies, leaving the
the contemporary
Hegelian synthesis of the two views is emerging in
era.

and no statement
No hint of it is given in the book, however,

of Karier's own position.

The reader is left to infer what that
17
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synthesis may be from Karier's subsequent writings.
In 1969 Karier published an article entitled Humanltas and the

Triumph of the Machine

in which he underlined the importance of

what he called the "humanist" position in his own point of view.^
In this article he argues that while the twentieth century saw the

triumph of the "humanitarian" ideology, "this freedom of the anthill

represents that side of the liberal enlightenment ... (which) rather
easily sacrificed the autonomy of the individual for the good of an

orderly society."

2

Two points in this connection are worth making,

one with regard to Karier's view of Dewey, and one about Karier's own
position.

Concerning Dewey, Karier argues that although Dewey did have
an appreciation for the moral worth of the individual, he seemed not
to understand the conflict of interest between the individual and

society, and to Karier Dewey appeared to be straddling the fence.

Karier xjrites that Dewey, in his affirmation of individual rights,
was "living off the moral capital of the past."

"Dewey erred," it

seems, "when he looked at science and technology and saw his own

values rather than an amoral instrument of intelligence which could
m3
it.
just as easily be used to destroy his 'humane age' as to achieve
.

individualKarier claims that Dewey's hope for a "scientific, humane,
ism"

that the
has not become a reality, and the implication is

individual against
concern of "humanism" to assert the rights of the

society should be reaffirmed.

19

As far as Karier's own position is concerned, it appears that
he sees humanism as losing out to humanitarianism, and requiring

Karier

s

own committment to the humanist camp.

As he moves toward the

humanists, he regards Dewey as a humanitarian rather than a mediator

between the two positions, as he tended to see him earlier.

Karier

now feels the necessity to reassert the humanist committment

to

moral standards validated by a non-naturalist metaphysic.
In 1969 Karier moved from Rochester to the University of

Illinois at Champagne-Urbana
critical of Dewey.

,

where his writing became more strongly

We can infer from his work a developing synthesis

of the earlier positions described by Karier as emerging from

antagonistic ideologies.

He is concerned primarily to assert the

moral worth of the individual against social views that seem to subject
individuals to the power of the state.

He believes that the moral

values of the humanist tradition must be reaffirmed against pragmatism.
He claims that democratic political procedures must be maintained
to protect the political equality of individuals, and that education

should emphasize liberal arts training to reinforce these values.

Nevertheless, his interest in individualism rejects the elitist social

views of Classical Humanism, and favors a pluralistic, indeed, a
class conflict, theory of society.

There is a hightening sense of

him to
moral urgency in his view of the social crisis, which attracts

radical political solutions, so that he can speak of "the
threats.
of the streets" and "revolution" as immanent

battle

But there is

no suggestion that he advocates militaristic or violent social

action as a political solution.
S’^ticle,

is

His aim, as stated in the Humanitas

a free man in a free society.*'

If this slogan has the

ring of the nineteenth century liberal to it, it is no surprise.

It

means resistance to strongly centralized social organization, denial
that the destructive force of institutions

can be controlled to

serve humane ends, rejection of technology, and strengthening of the

role of humanists as effective social critics.
Karier's Critique of Dewey

While Karier supported those features of Dewey’s thought that
affirmed the rights of the individual against domination by social
forces, he objected to those elements that seemed to work against this
end.

He objected to Dewey's pragmatic treatment of values, which

seemed to remove the legitimate authority of traditional values and
standards.

He opposed Dewey's view of technology as a generally

positive benefit to individual happiness and freedom.

Because he

thought Dewey advocated social control of individuals as a legitimate

educational and political end, he believed that Dewey was not really
committed to individualism in terms of political equality or

participatory democracy.

He viewed Dewey as uncommitted to minority

rights for blacks and immigrants.

He rejected liberalism because he

views of Dewey
saw it as a term for a social program to implement the
to

as Dewey'
which he objected, and he resisted Progressive Education

design for

public
a school system to inculcate his views through

^
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schooling.

He believed that Dewey developed a contrived
view of

history to support corporate capitalism, and that
he tried to

undermine the power of the oppressed

Pragmatism and the erosion of values

to resist political domination.

.

Karier maintains that Dewey's

work on the development of a pragmatic ethical theory damaged the
authority of traditionally established values, and led to open
disregard for principled behavior among public figures.

While Karier

does not discuss Dewey's ethical writings themselves, his main

evidence for this criticism

is a series of articles Dewey wrote,

mainly, in the New Republic , discussing the entry of the United

States into the First World War, and Dewey's attitude toward pacifists.

Randolph Bourne's criticism of Dewey is quoted as evidence of Dewey's
lack of a stable position on moral issues, and his proclamation of

efficiency of "technique" as a primary value.
Karier argues that Dewey, along with Herbert Croly, Walter
Lippman, and the other editors of the New Republic naively believed
that by supporting American entry into the First World War, the

government could be strengthened against the industrial sector. Thereby

intellectuals could bring pressure on business to surrender its
committment to private profit, and to serve a broader social interest.
In Karier' s view, when this course of action for the liberals was

opposed by the pacifists, the ethical emptiness of their position

became evident.

According to Karier, Dewey argued for the liberals
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that a priori claims, such as the pacifists'

claim

for the absolute

prohibition of war, were invalid, and that they ought rather to
acknowledge the overwhelming opposition to their position, and seek
the most practical accommodation possible.

He went on to say that

the use of force, or even violence, may represent an intelligent

utilization of energy.

Karier says.

This, then, was the cognitive process by which Dewey and many
liberal intellectuals justified the use of force while at the
same time avoiding the analysis of the political forces which
realistically control the ends. Thus ends in themselves were
depoliticized as they became methodological problems. Although
Dewey clearly rejected the older ethical tradition which held
as a priori certain principles, his use of the term efficiency
as a methodological criterion of judgment in this context
^
seemed to function almost as an a priori principle in itself.

Karier quotes Bourne's criticism of Dewey; "But there was
always that unhappy ambiguity in his doctrine as to just how values

were created."^

Karier believes that the role of the intellectual

ought to be one of value creator for society, and that it is this

prophetic role that Dewey failed to fulfill.

The role of liberalism in a capitalistic society. While Dewey seemed
against
to see himself as an advocate of a kind of industrial democracy

private capitalism, Karier maintains that opposition to capitalism
was neither Dewey's intention nor effect.

In fact, he was in favor of

work out a way
the economic status quo, and his writings sought to
of disruption, and
to accommodate social change with a minimum
v>rithout

alteration of existing authority structures.

g

Intellectuals
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who formulated the liberal point of view did so openly seeking the

recognition and acceptance of those in positions of power in business
and government.

This claim is documented by the support of intellec-

tuals for the war effort in 1917, by the willingness of those in the

educational testing movement to serve industrial needs, and by the

submissiveness of university faculties and administrations to the
interests of donors of large sums of money to their schools.

9

The role of liberals, such as Dewey, as servants of estab-

lished political and economic power is also reflected, Karier argues,
in their concern for social control and their fear of social conflict.

Dewey is viewed as a representative of the white, middle class, whose
concern for social organization is a device to protect his own class
interest and the system which produced the status he enjoyed.

Dewey's opposition to a class conflict theory of society is seen as
a denial of the need to resist violence so that the oppressed may

not realize the extent of their own influence.

Dewey's attempt to

formulate a "positive" concept of freedom is seen as a license to

government for totalitarian control of citizens and a service to the

...

newly emerging "managed corporate economy" of American capitalism.

Science and technology as a new theology

.

10

Karier traces the waning

Darwinism and
vitality of Protestantism to its confrontation with
the doctrines of
with higher Biblical criticism, and argues that

Americans searched for
organized religion lost their credibility as
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an alternative.

They turned to the "Social Gospel" of Walter

Rauchenbush and Jane Addams.

John Dewey, in Karier's view, with his

devotion to science, was a spokesman for the new religious ideology.
To Dewey, as to many who followed him, science and technology
were

the new theology.

All was tied to a quest for 'The Great Community'

where men would ultimately learn, as Dewey put it, 'to use their
scientific knowledge to control their social relations

.

Karier

interprets Dewey's vision as "a benign faith in scientific method and

technology" which Dewey believed would lead through inevitable

progress to a "humane age."

12

While Karier sympathizes with the

ideal, he believes Dewey made a fatal error in not distinguishing

science and technology from the economic and political forces

controling their use. Karier says, "In the world of twentieth century
power politics, however, most scientists and technologists became
hired men of the industrial militarized society."

13

Since the society

was controlled by self-seeking power elites, science and technology,
however benign, became corrupted.

Dewey's failure to note the evils

of political control of science and technology, according to Karier,

made his connection of science with democracy and individual freedom

not only false, but also an appealing ideological disguise for the
actual development of authoritarian forces in American life.

Dewey

that there
is responsible, in Karier's view, for enhancing the notion

must bow
are experts in social science to whose authority the public
in making social policy decisions.
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Individualism. Although the period of the Enlightenment had as its
impetus, Karier writes, both a concern for individual freedom and for

social harmony, as that tradition developed into twentieth century
liberalism, the first concern was lost for the sake of the second.
The collective side of that philosophy, with its scientifically
organized technology and computer-managed bureaucracy, has become
reality; on the other side, however, individual freedom, dignity,
and well-being have not fared so well. Caught up in collective
institutional progress, the individual has become a means rather
than an end to social order.

Specifically with respect to Dewey, Karier faults his idea of
"positive” freedom, which is understood as a way of getting individuals to submit voluntarily to the power of government, and to political

elites acting through government.

Dewey is held accountable especially in three respects.

First,

he developed a concept of democracy which rejected the autonomy of the

individual as well as the proceduaral safeguards for it in democratic
theory.

In Karier 's view, although Dewey affirmed the social rights

protection.
of individuals, there was no political way to assure their
as evidence
Karier 's analysis of the Polish study by Dewey is regarded

the individual
of Dewey's disregard for democratic procedures and

rights they protect.
could become
While Dewey claimed that science and technology

social goals like democracy and
a powerful instrument in realizing
inherent connection,"
individual freedom, "there is is no necessary,
says Karier,

that democracy
between the two. While Karier does not say

social values, he does suggest
and individual freedom are self-evident
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that Dewey was wrong in his pragmatic rejection of a priori values,

and in suggesting that science or the method of intelligence should

become "a creator of new values and ends."

heralded

He feared Dewey’s work

the development of an objective science of human values.

The third respect in which Dewey is to blame for betraying the
ideal of individualism is in his educational policies.

His educa-

tional views made an analogy between the social scientist as expert
and the teacher, so that a new authoritarianism could emerge in the

schools.

Not only were individuals forced into schools by compul-

sory education laws, but they were subjected to a training that

convinced them that their individuality really consisted in submission
to school authorities.

Says Karier, "His (Dewey's) community.

.

.

would necessitate a new man who found his individualism realized
in the emerging corporate community

Ideological history

.

Karier 's major criticism of Dewey's use of

history is that it lacked objectivity.

Karier quotes material in

which Dewey describes the role of history teaching in elementary
classes, and argues that because Dewey viewed history in the context
character
of classroom teaching, history was given an instrumental

which led to distortion of the past.

For example, since incidents

the grounds that
of racial violence and domination were excluded on

sense of responsithey did not contribute to confirming students'
seemed to present a
bility and control of their environment, Dewey
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false image of possible social harmony to children.

Perhaps even more significant, however, was the association
of

history with the idea of progress.

For Dewey, says Karier,

the world had purpose and meaning.

It remained simply to discover

"...

the meaning and rationalized purpose, and our place in that existent
19

world of work."

Dewey’s adoption of the idea of progress dictated

his selection of historical material in such a way as to make his

work an apology for the status quo, and a misrepresentation of the
actual history of America. Karier says.

Economic and industrial history, which Dewey repeatedly advocated,
was the kind that emphasized the rational, intelligent story of
mankind's progressive conquest over nature. It did not emphasize
those historical experiences which reflect the irrational, the
vicious struggle of man against man, or class against class,
involved in industrial history.

Political power

.

Karier 's criticisms of Dewey's attitude toward

political power are summarized in his most recent article. Schooling,
Education, and the Structure of Social Reality
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.

Karier believes

that both Marx and Dewey envisioned a society in which institutions

could contribute to the satisfaction of individual needs.

While Marx

regarded consciousness of class conflict as the means to bring about
the new society, Dewey eschewed the violence of revolution, and

advocated public education as the means for change.

Karier believes

that because Dewey was committed to the interest of the exploiting

would
class, he was unable or unwilling to support any action which

actually bring about the social change he envisioned.

"Dewey was not
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a radical revolutionary, but a liberal
who dreamed utopian dreams

and consistently rejected radical action."

Karier, apprently siding with the Marxist
position, believed
that Dewey made a fatal mistake in denying the
"social reality" of

class conflict.

By viewing knowledge or inquiry as a cooperative

social enterprise, and regarding "private egoism, private
profit,
and class consciousness as a social nemesis," Dewey undermined the

ability of oppressed classes to assert their legitimate rights
against those who had taken them away. The notion of "a broader,
more comprehensive social interest, free of self-interest, class
interest or ideological cant," was a myth, according to Karier,

which perpetuated Dewey's own social privilege and defeated the
very social aims he proclaimed. 23
The benign educational reality which Dewey constructed was an
artificial reality, divorced of selfish egoism and political
realities.
It was, however, a total world view, which could
have the effect of depriving a variety of classes of the
political and social consciousness necessary to effectively
confront those in power, while at the same time offering a
religious faith in an ultimate, non-violent, resolution of a
variety of social problems.

Assessment of Karier *s Critique of Dewey

Pragmatism and the erosion of traditional values

.

Karier 's comments

on Dewey's pragmatism to the effect that Dewey recommended that

efficiency be substituted for traditional values is based on a

superficial reading of Dewey's ethics.

It is a caricature which was

rejected by Dewey frequently during his own career.

Dewey did
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recommend the application of scientific method to ethical deliberation, not to arrive at values that possessed scientific objectivity
or certainty, but to provide a method of inquiry that would both

make it more likely that professed ideals be realized, and make it

clearer what ideals a person or group is committed to.

There is

nothing in his ethical writings to suggest that he supported
opportunistic behavior in political life.

This is exactly what he

decried.

Karier's argument is a non-sequitur in two respects.
argues that because Dewey opposed the pacifists in World War
his view

He first
I,

of moral values must be defective. Without discussing

Dewey's arguments against the concept of fixed values in Human Nature
and Conduct or Ethics , Karier can only assert, but not demonstrate,
that Dewey was wrong about the nature of values.

It is not self-

evident that Dewey's opposition to the pacifists was incorrect.

Dewey's claim was that while the pacifists may have been correct
that the entry of the United States into the war was wrong, it was

not so on the basis of a priori claims, but on the basis of the

consequences of the act.

He encouraged them to work to achieve their

goals through effective political action.
In the second place, Karier uses an ad hominem argument to

ethical
argue that since Dewey was a member of the middle class, his

middle class,
theories, insofar as they support the interests of the
cannot be true.

Even if, as Karier says, "Dewey's last wife was a

30

'^ulti-millionaire, "

27

his theories on the nature of values are not

thereby discredited.

Nevertheless, with respect to the more general import of

Karier's arguments about pragmatism, and its effect on principled
behavior on the part of Americans, and particularly those in public
life, Karier seems to be attributing to Dewey responsibility for

present moral distress.

28

Karier sees the present in terms of

moral decadence, highlighting, as he does, racism, militarism, and
class conflict, although one could just as easily Interpret it
(as Dewey does) as a transition from an age which relied on one set

of cultural beliefs and social structures to another in which the

beliefs and structures are yet to be formulated, that will enable
individuals to give moral meaning to the new conditions.

Dewey

made an important contribution to the new age in his proposals
for a naturalistic ethic.

Its effectiveness in dealing with con-

temporary social problems can hardly be dismissed as casually as

Karier does in equating it with opportunistic relativism.

With respect to the role of intellectuals as creators of
values in society, no doubt Dewey would agree that intellectuals

ought to be men and women of principle.

However, the material

Karier adduces to show that, in the Progressive era intellectuals
and integrity,
ceased to be the social critics, standing for truth

seem historically
and suddenly became servants of power, does not
accurate.

in his
Thomas More, no doubt, was as much an exception

31

day as Karier believes he would be today.

It is not Dewey's

pragmatism that is responsible for the moral decisions of the
academic community as a whole or of particular academics. Their
decisions are the product of numerous considerations, whether they

draw on Dewey's work or a distortion of it to explain themselves.

Karier is incorrect in making Dewey responsible for the subservience
of academics to government, particularly in view of Dewey's explicit

remarks condemning such behavior.

29

The role of liberalism in a capitalist society

with respect to Dewey seems to be as follows:

.

Karier 's argument
since Dewey opposed

social violence, and since the only way to change the status quo is
Since

through violence, Dewey must have favored the status quo.

Dewey was a member of the middle class, and since the status quo
favored the middle class, Dewey must have favored the status quo.
It is clear that the problem with this argument is Karier'

s

own

assumption that social violence is the only way to change the
status quo.^^

Dewey did not agree with that; his position was a

plausible one at the time.

His writings repeatedly called for

explicit.
social change, and his opposition to violence was

Liberalism and Social Action

In

he enumerates several arguments against

social change.
the use of violent force to bring about

First,

made without violence.
history records significant social changes

destructive power that it
Second, warfare had so advanced in its
parties.
could mean the common ruin of contending

Third, arguments
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for the use of violence justify its use by claiming that it is a

last resort, since all the agencies of power are in the hands of the

economic elite.

If this is so, the use of violence is all the more

Fourth, arguments for the use of violence claim that the

absurd.

only alternative is to work through existing political institutions

which are ineffective.

In fact, Dewey says, these institutions do

change with social pressure and circumstances, and they deserve to
be tried.
the

Fifth, force breeds counter force; given the record of

Russian revolution, "it is permissable to look with considerable

suspicion upon those who assert that suppression of democracy is the
road to adequate establishment of genuine democracy.”

31

The

alternative Dewey supports is the method of experimental intelligence.
If

Dewey rejected violence as the means to bring about

social change, it was not because he did not want seriously to see
the change occur.

He wrote

In short, liberalism must now become radical, meaning by "radical"
perception of the necessity of thoroughgoing changes in the
set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring
If radicalism be defined as perception of
changes to pass.
which
the need for radical change, then today any liberalism
2
doomed.
is not also radicalism is irrelevant and
.

.

to be
While he did not specify the political program that ought

inclusive plan, and
pursued, he did favor a reform movement with an

organizations.
he supported actively numerous reform
in a sense that
Although Karier uses the term "orderly change"
of a subject class.
connotes authoritarian control and domination
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Dewey did favor orderly change in a different sense.

On the level

of the individual life, orderly control of one's
environment in

order to be assured that it yield the necessities of survival
was a

primary biological and social aim.

At a social level, the aim of the

individual was to create and share a social setting which would

continue to support him in developing his capacity for orderly control
as well as in his effort to extend that control to broader reaches of

the environment.

There was nothing inherently authoritarian about

the nature of control in Dewey's view.

This view of the individual and his primary community was
the basis of Dewey's critique of capitalist society.

The production

of goods for profit created systematic frustration of individual

needs and of the ability of individuals to create and enjoy supportive
social community.

In Dewey's view, larger institutions, like commerce,

industry, and government, could be reformed to make the progressive

realization of community for individual members their principal aim.
Social control, exercised in the interest of enhancing individual
control, as, for example, with more equitable laws or social

policies, did not seem to Dewey to be the same authoritarianism
that Karier implies with his concept of social control.

Karier's

argument, therefore, that Dewey actually supported the status quo

because of his concern for orderly change, seems based on a

misinterpretation

of the idea of orderly social change and social

control found in Dewey.

If there were a nefarious power in control

1
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of institutions, systematically preventing orderly
social change

or defeating egalitarian reform, Dewey did not see it.

He read the

history of change as offering at least the possibility of intelligent

moral choice.

Science and technology.

Two points are made by Karier in relation to

science and technology.

The first is that technology cannot be a

solution to the problems of social change, as Dewey maintains, because
it involves dependence on economic resources which are controlled by

capitalists who do not want social change in the direction of greater
social equality.

The second is that Dewey favored giving authority

in social policy making to an elite of scientific experts.

With regard to the first point, Dewey’s support for science
and technology was based on a much broader definition of the words
than Karier appears to use.

By science Dewey meant not a body of

information about the physical world so much as the principles of

experimental inquiry.

The imperative of our time, Dewey said, is that

while the method of scientific inquiry has been confined to knowledge
of the physical world, and excluded from the formulation of the ends
to which the discoveries of technology have t)een put, the formulation

of values themselves must be put to the test of experimental inquiry.

Values are empty and sentimental rather than guides to action if they
conditions
are held apart from a knowledge of their attendant physical
and consequences.

But when they are formulated in conjunction with
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experimental method, they are found to be in constant transition

relative to new circumstances and possibilities.

Therefore,

scientific method and technology are of supreme importance.

They

are not an "amoral instrument of intelligence", as Karier suggests.

Rather, they constitute the only way man can make his values a

matter of deliberate choice instead of a matter of authority, habit,
or blind impulse.

Karier, of course, is concerned because intelligence can be

used for immoral purposes, as can science and technology.
not blind to that fact.

Dewey is

But the mere misuse of an instrument is not

an argument against its proper use.

Dewey is saying that although

science and technology have indeed been misused, they are indispensible to the achievement of responsible formulation of social aims
and the realization of social values.

Basic to human survival is provision for the economic require-

ments of life.

Any consideration of the morality of human conduct

must recognize that moral behavior takes for granted a human

community in which the necessities of economic security are assured.
Science and technology are the most effective instruments yet

developed to see that the economic necessities of life could be
provided in the present world.

While they have not yet been put to

serve. If it is
that end, that is the moral function that they could
of science and
true, as Dewey would agree, that the proper end

that they should
technology has been subverted, that is not to say

\
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not be rescued from misuse.

Karler's argument, then, claims that because capitalism has
achieved unassailable control over science and technology, they can
not now be put to an acceptable social purpose.

Dewey would disagree.

Here is where

The evidence of the past is mixed.

There have

been examples of the humane use of science and technology, and they

furnish evidence for a reasonable hope that despite the control of
capitalism, they may be used so again.

Whether capitalism's control

over the resources of technology is absolute, as Karier claims, is

an empirical question that is still open.
In The Public and Its Problems Dewey considers the arguments
of those who defend the political control of the masses by an

aristocratic group of "experts".

His conclusion is that such a

proposal is inconsistent with democratic government: "The man who

wears the shoe best knows that it pinches, and where it pinches,
even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how it is to be
remedied.

But the main theme of the passage deals with the rela-

tion of the work of experts to democratic procedures.

Dewey says,

their
"Inquiry, indeed, is a work which devolves upon experts, but

but in
expertness is not shown in forming and executing policies,

former
discovering and making known the facts upon which the

depend.

the
The suggestion by Karier that Dewey favored

.
experts is untrue.
political domination of citizens by scientific

Some writers, such as Christopher

Hum

and Mich ael Katz,
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suggests that there is an anti-democratic, authoritarian quality

built into bureaucratic structure of institutions so that officially

constituted "experts” usurp decision making no matter how demo-

cratically the organization was originally created.

They argue that

there are laws of organizational behavior that inevitably require
the centralization of authority, and that this type of organization
is required by the complexity of social and economic problems

of the present.

In response to this position, Diane Ravitch says that this

argument reflects a determinism that does not represent actual
There is no necessary relation between organizational

circumstances.

structure and the purposes to which the organization is put.
Historically, organizations like the public schools have been
formed for many purposes, only one of which was orderly control of
students.

Even if bureaucratic organization does have a tendency to

support hierarchical authority, and to eliminate democratic

exercise of power, there is no reason to suppose that the structure

may not be used for other purposes, especially when the constituency
desires different outcomes for the organization.

The move to

decentralize decision-making has been one such attempt to accommodate
bureaucratic structure to more democratic purposes.

Individualism

.

While it may be true that there is a great difference

of individualism,
between Karier's and Dewey's views on the topic

major works on the
Karier's comments fail to take into account Dewey's
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topic.

Individualism Old and New

,

for example, has as a major

point the contention that in terms of method, it is an error to

contrast the concept of individual

with the concept of society.

The habit of opposiing corporate and collective to the individual
tends to the persistent continuation of the confusion and the
uncertainty.
It detracts attention from the crucial issue:
how shall the individual refind himself in an unprecedentedly
new social situation, a^(^ what qualities will the new
individualism exhibit?

Dewey's claim is not that there are alternative kinds of individualism, but that all individualism has been lost in the American social

experience, not only for the unemployed masses, but for the "captains
of industry" as well: an observation anticipating William Whyte's

Organization Man.

The reason for the loss is that individualism is

constituted not by some intrinsic quality, but by a set of cultural
values and ideas supported by appropriate social arrangements which

allow a person to perceive himself and his activity as having
shared meaning and social purpose.
The difference between

Karier's view of the individual and

Dewey's, which Karier perceives as a betrayal of individualism, can
be traced to an uncritical dichotomy in Karier's own thinking

between the individual and his social setting.

Dewey's contribution

to the subject has been his exploration of the nature of

individualism in terms of the way various characteristics of social
experiences
life can either provide or deny to the individual those
growth.
that create a sense of individuality and personal
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With regard to Karier’s suggestion that Dewey's concept of
positive" freedom was a screen created for the purpose of getting

individuals to collaborate in their own subjugation, let us

examine the distinction between positive and negative freedom in

Dewey's writing.
There can be no greater mistake, however, than to treat such
freedom, (mobility or freedom of physical movement) as an
end in itself.
It then tends to be destructive of the shared
cooperative activities which are the normal source of order.
But, on the other hand, it turns freedom, which should be
positive, into something negative. For freedom from restriction,
the negative side, is to be prized only as a means to a freedom
which is power; power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to
evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from
acting upon them; power to select and' order means to carry chosen
ends into operation. 38

There is nothing in this extension of the concept of freedom from one
of absence of restraint to one of capacity to formulate and carry out

purposes that implies authoritarian control.
With regard to the suggestion by Karier that there is
something wrong with Dewey's definition
"first.

.

.

of Democracy, Karier says,

Dewey changed the meaning of terms like democracy, freedom,

and equality, and secondly,

.

.

.

the meanings of these terms might

best be discovered in action situations."
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Certainly it was true

to
that such terms were developed into extended concepts central

stipulative
Dewey's philosophy, and were therefore given systematic,

definition.

Nevertheless, their meanings were not made contrary to

suggests. Dewey
the common sense meanings of the terms, as Karier

40

considered the concept of democracy principally an ethical concept
encompassing the goal of full and free growth of individual capacities
in a social community.

Democratic procedures, like individual

suffrage and majority rule, were not absolute, but were useful

procedures for realizing the ethical goal of democratic life in a
given social setting.

Other settings, like the family, could be

democratic without them.

The task of intelligent inquiry was to

formulate whatever political devices would be necessary to realize
democratic goals in any changing social setting. It is this willingness
to consider new political forms that has disturbed Karier and led him
to fear that Dewey has surrendered too much by acknowledging the

relativity of the procedures that have been identified with democracy.
But it is clear that Dewey was in no way reducing the common sense

notion of democracy, but making a distinction intended to make its
application clearer and more effective.
Karier claims that "neither democracy nor individual freedom
had any necessary or inherent connection with science and technology."
are
In this view, the social relations of science and technology

ignored.

Dewey believed that there was such a connection, which was

based on his understanding of the ethical nature of democracy.
early work. The Ethics of Democracy
Democracy, in a
conception, and
significance as
only because it

,

In an

he says.

word, is social, that is to say, an ethical
upon its ethical conception is based its
governmental. Democracy is a form of government^^
association.
is a form of moral and spiritual
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He goes

to state the implication of such a view, saying that

on.

because it is ethical, "democracy must become industrial." Although
traditional thinking has distinguished the spiritual from the material aspects of life, and equated the ethical with the former but not

the latter

,

it is necessary that men come to understand the

ethical significance of every part of life.
That the economic and industrial life is in itself ethical, that
it is to be made contributory to the realization of personality
through the formation of a higher, more complete unity among men,
this is what we do not recognize.
But such is
of the
statement that democracy must become industrial.
In this respect, science and technology,

(i.e.

science as the method

of experimental intelligence and technology as the application of

the products of that inquiry to humane ends) is the instrument of

bringing about the goal of industrial democracy.
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As to whether the

connection between science and technology and the purposes it should
serve were necessary and inherent, Dewey certainly observed that in
the past the connection had not been made, but he argued that there

was no reason to suppose that in the future the connection should
not be made.
It is not difficult, then, to see why Dewey could regard

science as a potential creator of new values.

His major premis is

Value
that experience is open-ended, always in the process of change.
are guides to action as they are applied to changing circumstances.
scope of
The more intelligently they are applied, the greater the
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consequences action can encompass.

Science as a method of intelli-

gent inquiry into possible ends can Improve the quality of
values

inherited from tradition by modifying them to fit new circumstances
and thereby create new values for new situations.

This is not to

ssy that cherished values like individualism and democracy are to

be discarded, but that they are able to be transformed to apply
to hitherto unforseen circumstances.
If Karier understands Dewey’s view of schooling as

inculcating a view of individualism that submerges personal freedom
in the aims of society, then he has not heard the constant claim of

Dewey that such is not his intention.

It was Dewey’s belief that

schooling can and ought to develop the capacities of individuals in
a way that is not hostile to their social participation, but assists

others in the same development

.

If Karier does not see this ideal

being realized in schools today, he does not therefore demonstrate
the error of Dewey’s objective of a non-competitive individualism.

Ideological history

.

Karier ’s critique of Dewey on the topic of his-

tory lies in Dewey’s tendency to use it for what appears to Karier
as the wrong political purpose.

Karier would prefer to see history

used to raise popular class consciousness so that individuals are

sensitized to political oppression, and are willing to resist

aribtrary authority.

He sees Dewey as selecting historical material

and
in such a way as to depoliticize students and general readers,
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appealing to motives which defuse a sense of anger at political
injustice.

Karier is correct in observing that Dewey uses history for a

different purpose from his own, but he is mistaken in his idea of

what Dewey is doing with history and why he is doing it.
cites Charles

S.

Karier

Peirce's comment on Dewey's work, Studies in Logical

Theory , but he misunderstands Dewey's point and Peirce's as well.^^
Karier says.
For Dewey, the very nature of logic itself was historically
determined.
It was this point which led Charles S. Peirce
to critically review Dewey's Studies in Logic and suggest that
Dewey and his followers seemed to have confused logic with a
natural history of thought.

This is not what Peirce said in his review, where, instead of making
a negative criticism of Dewey, he praised him for his innovation.

Peirce writes, "He (Dewey) seemes to regard what he calls 'logic' as
a natural history of thought.

If such a natural history can be

worked out, it will undoubtably form valuable knowledge, and with all
our heart we wish the Chicago school godspeed in their enterprise of
46

discovery. M
,

.

Karier then goes on to quote from Dewey's 1938 Logic: A Theory
of Inquiry

.

In this volume Dewey says that in contrast to the view

validity,
of Absolute Idealism that logical forms have an a priori

inquiry
logical forms can be shown to emerge from the process of

which occurs in experience.

Correspondingly, historical forms

are shaped by the
emerge from the process of historical inquiry, and

/
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existential context in which the history is written.
The implication of Dewey’s claim is that there is no absolute

context in which a definitive history can be written, but a multitude
of contexts for different histories.

If Karier objects to the

selection of historical events Dewey makes, it is not because there
is some absolute, finite collection, the true character of which

Dewey has disguised, but because the criteria of selection are
different for Dewey and Karier.

Karier is concerned that the

criteria be that the events chosen motivate the reader to challenge
unjust treatment of individuals and minorities by legally appointed
authorities.

Dewey is concerned about this objective, but he is also

concerned with developing an attitude and habit of inquiry with
respect to social issues.

Friction

,

As he mentions in Racial Prejudice and

with many social problems, the temptation is to

invest more effort in condemning the evil than in inquiry as to the

definition of the problem and in finding an effective solution.

For

inquiry
this reason Dewey sees the context of historical writing as
into social policy formation.

historical
Karier ’s own concern seems to be less a question of
for less of
method, then, than a plea for moral indignation, and

the emotional neutrality

of inquiry when it comes to issues of

potentially inflammatory public interest.

He is probably correct that

the time Dewey wrote.
since the social context has changed since
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certain social issues deserve more serious concern than Dewey thought
they did.

But Karier's interest would be served better by focusing

on the present situation than on a critique of Dewey's historiography.
First, it is not true that Dewey held the uncritical view of

social progress attributed to him by Karier.

The central contention

of his experimentalism was that the future course of events was open,

and that its successful or disasterous outcomes could not be

predicted.

The outcome depended on the intelligent exercise of

responsible choice in the present.

Dewey explicitly says that primi-

tive man was not less endowed with moral sentiment than modern man.
So in terms of moral sentiments,

there is no "progress".

There has

been a development in the social occasions and channels to express
those sentiments, however. Dewey says.

problem which now confronts us, the problem of progress, is
same in kind (as developing technology in natural sciences)
It is a problem of discovering
differing in subject matter.
needs and capacities of collective human nature as we find
it aggregated' in racial or national groups on the surface of
the globe, and of inventing the social machinery which will
available powers operating for the satisfaction of those needs.

The
the
but
the

Political power.

Karier's most recent criticism of Dewey is framed

in terms of political power:

Dewey's social analysis concealed the

fact of political conflict and its role in social change.

In so doing

to the disadvanhe effectively supported the existing power structure

in educational
tage of the subject classes, including students

settings.

A6

To begin with, it is not accurate to say that Dewey
concealed

the fact of political conflict or its role in social change.

There

are ample references to the presence of political conflict in his
but he held that the mere fact of conflict was secondary to the

discovery of the nature of the conflict and the means of resolving

it.

In fact, all political activity was of secondary nature to social and

economic activity.
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In the view of those who have investigated

Dewey’s political theory, however, Karier may be correct in focusing
on the analysis of power in Dewey’s political theory.

George Raymond Geiger, writing in 1939 about "Dewey’s Social
and Political Philosophy," noted that in the context of the social

crisis at the start of the second World War, the atmosphere of social

emergency raised questions about specific political choices which

Dewey’s instrumentalism seemed not to address: how could democratic
tolerance be granted to those who would destroy it?

How could a

liberal social philosophy, which values reflective doubt and exploration, act decisively in a crisis?

What kind of resources for

o30
motivation can be derived from making intelligence a priority:
.

.

In reviewing Dewey’s work from the point of view of a political

scientist, A.H.Somjee in 1967 recognizes that Dewey made a notable

contribution to the theory of political science with his The Public
and its Problems

in 1938.

Its major contribution was its suggestion

phenomena.
for a conceptual framework with which to analyse political
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as well as his substitution of interactional models for traditional

absolutist concepts.

Nevertheless, as much as Dewey stressed the

concept of political power, he tended to subsume the idea of control
of political phenomena under the idea of control of phenomena in

scientific inquiry generally.

In Somjee's view Dewey’s political

theory was weakened by a lack of attention to specifically political
types of control that could be possible and desirable.
This criticism reflects less of a problem with Dewey's theory
than a direction for its extension.

Yet, if Karier’s concern for

more explicit treatment of the role of political power

in Dewey’s

work includes a desire to see the ways that theory can be effectively
applied to the critical issues of the present, his critique would be
a useful addition to the legacy of Dewey's work, as well as a

contribution to scholarship.
In general, then, Karier does not adequately distinguish Dewey’s

work from that of other liberals, as Charles Forcey and Morton White
are careful to do.

It does not distinguish the ideological issues

that lie behind his differences with Dewey, and relies too heavily

on dialectical contrast
and "humanitarianism."

of poorly defined concepts like "humanism"

Nevertheless, he has a sense of urgency about

policy.
dealing with contemporary issues in education and social

A

that objective.
more careful reading of Dewey would help him realize

CHAPTER III
WALTER FEINBERG:
DEIJEY'S LIBERALISM AND THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY

Introduction

Walter Feinberg is widely known in the area of educational

philosophy through his numerous publications and his active participation in national professional associations.

Since receiving his

degree in philosophy at Boston University in 1966, except for a year
at Oakland University in California, he has been on the education

faculty at the University of Illinois at Champagne-Urbana , Illinois.^
In addition to his articles in defense of the humanities and on

educational theory, he has written a book. Reason and Rhetoric

,

which

is a critique of liberalism and John Dewey's work, and edited two

books. Work, Technology, and Education

and Equality and Social Policy

The method described in the first chapter of Reason and Rhetoric
is illustrative of Feinberg 's work in general.

He sees education

as a subdivision of political philosophy in which expression of ideas
is controlled by ideological aims.

His objective is to identify the

"tensions" or conflicts underlying assumptions in the ideology of
liberalism, especially in relation to Progressive educational reform
in America.

He believes that although liberals thought

that their

scientific objectivity placed them beyond ideology, liberalism was
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itself an ideology, and its reform proposals were motivated by

principles which were uncritical of their own service to middle-class
interests.

Feinberg thinks that the liberal principles reflect

committment to beliefs about social conditions that may formerly have
seemed unalterable.

But in fact the committments were then and are

now matters of choice.

The choices, Feinberg maintains, are

ultimately moral ones, and his analysis seeks to expose the "tension"
in liberalism that violates fundamental moral values.

For example,

he sees a tension between liberal respect for individual rights and

approval of technological development.

But the tension was resolved

by giving priority to technological requirements.

The basic value

which liberalism compromised was individual freedom and equality. His
book and most of his articles are devoted to showing how Dewey and
other individuals who used the rhetoric of freedom, devised a rationale
to undermine individual freedom through public education.

Feinberg *s Critique of Dewey

Technology and morality

.

A major theme of Feinberg *s is the threat

human
which the development of technology has come to present to
freedom.

Technology represents that which is non-human or artificial,

as opposed to that which is genuinely human.

While he acknowledges

distinction, he believes
that liberals like Dewey refuse to make such a
does not appear to be
that there is a dynamic in technology that
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controlled by human will, and which is capable of enslaving the
human will to its requirements.

He cites the development of military

technology as an example of technology potentially destroying its
creator.

Liberalism was the ideology that historically arose with

the development of technology, and served to adapt American attitudes

and values to its needs.

In order to support this view, Feinberg

interprets Dewey's work "Evolution and Ethics"

as an attempt to

formulate a Darwinian view of moral values which would weaken the
power of traditionally established values to control the activity of

science and technology.

The eighteenth century required science

and technology to submit to fixed ideas of htiman nature and society,
and to "a set standard" of moral values.

3

In the name of scientific

objectivity, however, Dewey proposed a biological model of human

nature rather than an ethical model, and tried to show the way in

which moral values played an instrumental part in the struggle for
survival.

According to Feinberg, Dewey argued that "ethical

behavior was consistent with evolutionary activity because in the
long run the survival of the fittest meant the survival of the

ethically best."^

Therefore, Dewey was substituting an evolutionary

and functionalist criterion for a theological one.

The consequence

relativism which
of this change, in Feinberg' s view, was an ethical
values, but paved
not only subverted the authority of traditional
to manipulate
the way for a system of education that was free
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children's attitudes in the interest of conformity without the
control of traditional ethical sanctions. That which was distinctively human, "the will", was objectified and reduced to an object of

manipulation and control.

The testing movement.

In connection with the testing and vocational

education movements, Feinberg regards Dewey's influence as favorable.
He credits Dewey with a more far-sighted vision of the moral purposes
of education than the leaders of technology who sponsored the

testing movement, and he commends Dewey's concern to keep the goals
of community and individuality prominent, as opposed to those who

considered public education as an instrument of industrial training.
Nevertheless, Feinberg argues, Dewey failed to see that there was no

necessary connection between an individual's interest and the
possibility of satisfying that interest in the existing labor market.
He criticizes Dewey for not opposing the concept and practice of the

division of labor, and for not recognizing the way in which Dewey's
schools
own educational goals and methods were applied differently in
class.
of the middle class as opposed to those of the lower

is the tension
Equal opportunity. If one of the problems of liberalism

of technological
between traditional morality and the requirements
of technology, not
development, Dewey can be seen as taking the side

in the emphasis he put
only in his work on evolutionist ethics, but
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on schooling as an instrument of equal opportunity.

equal opportunity may be

The concept of

seen as a way of reconciling the require-

ments of a technologically based industry and the demands of workers
for justice in the distribution of economic rewards.

Equal

opportunity as a principle of educational policy claims that

if

,

in

the commercial and industrial sector, the rewards an individual

receives do not seem commensurate with what he fairly deserves, at
least in schooling there will be justice.

The rewards in terms of

academic achievement will be a reflection of talent or ability, and
not of contingent qualities such as race, religion, family background, or wealth.

If it is assumed that scholastic achievement

correlates with achievement in commerce and industry, then schooling
can offer something to both business and labor.

To the employee it

can promise a just compensation for his efforts and talent, at first
in school, and later in employment;
a pool of skilled labor.

and to business it can offer

Feinberg believes that this view was

central to educational liberalism.

He understands Dewey’s emphasis

other social
on schooling, as opposed to the educative function of
support
institutions, to be due to his concern to have schooling

technological development.

That is, Dewey's willingness to narrow

that his broad
education to include no more than schooling suggests

than his more limited
aims for personal growth were less important
the needs of one's service
aims for skill development compatible with
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to existing technology.

The question raised by Feinberg is, given

the requirements of industrial or technological developnnent

,

and

those of a just reward for Individual effort, when the two come into

conflict, on which side does Dewey come down?^

Feinberg cites two examples to support his belief that Dewey’s
choice is to support industrial technology against distributive
justice.

The first is a summary of the Polish study which describes

Dewey as opposing the rights of Polish immigrants for self determination, and as subjecting them to arbitrary tests of their loyalty to

the United States because they resisted Americanization and submission
to the military and industrial interests of this country.

A second

example is Dewey's comment on P.S 26, a black school in Indianapolis
in Schools of Tomorrow

.

Dewey gives a very favorable account of the unusual vocational
education program and the community relations activities under the
title of "The School as Settlement."

Feinberg, however, comments

that Dewey failed to use this occasion as an opportunity to comment

either on racial segregation or on the way equal opportunity is

readily compromised for members of the lower class. Dewey has praise
word for the
for the school’s contribution of trained labor but not a

requirements of justice in this situation.

Concept of history.

Another aspect of the tension between techno-

of progress.
logy and morality had to do with the concept

Feinberg

/

54

maintains that although not much of a case could be made for
progress in moral terms since man’s earliest civilization, technology required some concept of progress to give moral support to its

expansion.

Liberalism provided the support with the "new history"

of Robinson, Beard, and Dewey.

I'Jhile

Dewey is not accused of the

excessive praise of progress, he is said to have established the
theoretical foundation for it in his denial of the universality of

knowledge in Logic; The Theory of Inquiry.

According to Feinberg,

Dewey argues that science and technology "were so new and so
significant to man’s experience that they required a reinterpretation
of human values and their institutional expressions."

The view of

this position provided by most interpreters of Dewey was that

Dewey recognized the social havoc technology was causing and he
wished to support efforts to adjust institutions to new conditions.
Feinberg, however, reasons that the role of scholarship ought "to be
to try first to be clear about the nature of human values, and then
to try to limit technology according to the requirements of certain

ethical norms.
As Feinberg summarized Dewey’s view of history, he emphasized
historiography.
Dewey's stress on the constructive social function of
for his
Dewey argued that the historian must accept responsibility

social needs.
choice of issues to research in terms of contemporary
but neutral
Feinberg says, however, that "Dewey was anything

in his

f
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opinion of how that responsibility should be discharged.^ Feinberg
believes that Dewey thought that there was really only one set of
social issues to which historiography should be oriented, and that
was industrialization, the development of technology, democratic

institutions, and scientific procedures.

While Dewey himself, Fein-

berg says, did not go so far as to say that America was the realiz-

ation of the democratic dream, Dewey's view of history lent itself
to the work of other liberals who did take this position.

Dewey's

fault, then, in terms of his view of history, was to have failed to

anticipate the value of the traditional view of the objectivity of
the past in the light of the pressures of powerful institutions
and movements to write history in their own interest.

Social theory.

In addition to a view of the past that served

technological development, Feinberg describes a view of society that
formed the liberal contribution to the same purpose.

Although

liberals in the late 1920s and early 1930s acquired a reputation for
radicalism, Feinberg says that their actual conservatism was not

obvious until the time of the depression, when, in contrast to
forced to
Marxist theories of social class conflict, liberals were

develop a pressure group theory of society.

Frontier

Although the Soci^

of
did publish a series of articles in which a number

analysis and its
liberal educators debated Marxist theory of class
others came
implications for schooling, Dewey along with the

to
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reject that position in favor of the pressure group
theory, first

proposed by Arthur Bentley in 1908.®

According to Feinberg, class

analysis differed from pressure group theory in giving
priority to

normative questions of just distribution of wealth, while the
latter
pretended to give a descriptive analysis of existing political
process.

The assumption of pressure group theory was that questions

of distributive justice were not significant since the balancing of

countervailing interest groups by government produced the best

resolution of conflict that was possible.

In Feinberg 's view, this

amounted to substituting social order for social justice, and this

substitution he recognizes as an identifying characteristic of
liberal social theory.
He acknowledges that Dewey and Manheim recognized a concept
of "functional rationality" by which western society was progress-

ively incorporating both men and machines into a system of production
and distribution which placed increasingly large intellectual demands

on those at the top of the social hierarchy, and increasingly less
on those at the bottom.

And Feinberg admits that there is ground

for their fear that this "drive toward functional rationality" would

endanger humanitarian social goals, but he also says that their

remedies were, at best, pedestrian.

The explanation Feinberg gives

for their ineffectiveness is that liberals, including Dewey, saw
the role of the intellectual, not as a critic of the social system*
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but as loyal advisor.

In response to the revisionist historians’ charge that liberals

have manipulated those whom their rhetoric claims to have freed,

Feinberg says that the charge must be made more specific.

The

clarification he suggests is that liberals have made the advancement
of technology their goal and the principle of implementing it

functional integration.

Schools were to aim at modifying behavior

as well as values, to make children fit the needs of technology, but

no means was provided by which the moral value of technology or

functional integration could be evaluated by the students.

"With

social science as the vehicle and functional integration as the
goal, the moral aspects of manipulation were seen as the remnant of
a distant and inadequate metaphysics."

9

The revisionists were

mistaken in making an issue merely out of the schools as an instrument
of social control.

The real issue was not that the schools taught

children what the rules were for playing the economic game, but that
they did not teach them to test the rules.

"In the long run the

but to
function of education should be not only to teach the rules,

teach students to evaluate their effectiveness.

Principle of equality

.

..10

The question of fairness raises a final

challenge Feinberg makes to liberalism:
of equality of educational opportunity.

a revision of the doctrine

Liberalism, he says, made

with the concept of equality
its historic contribution to education
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of opportunity.

It was a value as an advance over the earlier

principle of allocating educational resources on the basis of
inherited status.

However, equality of opportunity is a dated

principle because as a guide to allocating educational resources
today, it arbitrarily limits those qualities it considers contingent.

That is, while it denies that race, religion, sex, or ethnic back-

ground are relevant to the amount or quality of schooling received,
the principle does not exclude intelligence, talent, or genetic

endowment.

Feinberg argues that if the principle of educational

opportunity worked perfectly, it would continually grant greater
advantage to the fewer and fewer people of greater ability, until
the distinction between the culturally rich and poor became so
extreme, all possibility of "equality" would be lost.

Progressively,

those with less cultural advantage would lose the skills to argue for

and compel the resources that they would need to survive.

He proposes then to substitute a "principle of equality
the liberals’ "principle of equality of opportunity."

for

The

principle of equality would provide that access to educational reequally to all,
sources, along with civil rights, would be alio ted

independent of individual ability.
is needed,

When a socially important skill

development.
excess resources could be allocated for its

the excess resources, the
In order to select the person to receive
to a disproportionate share
rule would be, "that a person is entitled
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of the educational expenditure when there is reasonable evidence to

indicate that he is able to reach a specifiable (but not elaborated)
level of professional competence,

and when he demonstrates that he

is willing to apply a disproportionate share of his energy towards

directly and consciously improving the general well-being and
specifically the well-being of the least advantaged member of

society'.'

This principle of equality, Feinberg suggests, will fulfill the

requirement of justice and morality which liberalism abandonned
in its devotion to technological development.

SuTTimary.

Feinberg’

s

critique of Dewey may be summarized under the

following points:
1)

Dewey' s ultimate ideological committment was to technological

development in the United States.

His experimentalist view of

ethics and morality was a device to persuade individuals to see

their own interests as served by supporting the growth of

industrial technology.
2)

of
Dewey was correct in resisting the exploitative character

that he did not
the Testing Movement in education, but the fact

his real motive
object to the division of labor indicates that

more highly
was to make public schooling a place to train
skilled labor.
3)

as educational policy
Dewey's affirmation of equal opportunity

young people to accept unequal
was in practice a way of getting
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distribution of economic rewards on the basis of personal
traits which were not in fact within their control.

Equal

educational opportunity, therefore, worked to bring about
economic inequality.
4)

Dewey's instrumentalist view of history contributed to the
liberal myth of America as the realization of moral and social
progress, which concealed growing social conflict.

5)

Dewey’s support for the pressure group theory instead of a
class conflict theory substituted concern for social stability for a desire for social justice.

6)

A new "principle of equality" could help schooling lead to
genuine economic equality.

Assessment

Technology.

The problem of technology in Dewey has been discussed

before,^^ and Feinberg adds little to what has already been said
except his ideological interpretation.

Dewey was aware of both the

in his
benefits and penalties of technology, and he was not one-sided

praise of technology.

But, granted the destructive effects of

technology, what was to be done about it?

Dewey observed that its

in its processes,
benefits were more apparent in its products than

had become dehumanizing to
and he acknowledged that the processes

many workers.

could be
Yet his belief was that the processes
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rehumanized.

He argued that the destructiveness of technology was

a historical and not a logical fact, and that the most
urgent social

task that confronted industrial nations was the development of

methods of production which support the full human development of
their workers.^^
But Feinberg argues further: "One of the fixed conditions
that the liberal accepted was the continued growth of technology as

the factor around which all other aspects of men’s social and

intellectual activity was to be adjusted

including his will."^^

While it is true that Dewey did consider the growth of technology
as a cultural given, and one that promised great benefits if managed

intelligently, it is untrue to say that Dewey wished to adjust the

human will to the requirements of technology.

His concern to

humanize industrial relations stressed just the opposite, the
adjustment of technology to human social needs. He stated.
This then is the task indicated. It is, if we employ large terms,
The task in the concrete cannot be
to humanize science.
accomplished save as the fruit of science, which is named
technology, is also humanized.
At the beginning of Reason and Rhetoric Feinberg maintains that

he himself is ambivalent about technology, but that he intends to go
on "to examine the thought and activity of those people who believed

that technology was not an essential threat to man."

His conclusion

technology is in
by the end of the book, however, seems to be that
fact a threat to human freedom.

We may conclude, then, that he is no
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longer ambivalent, and that he now agrees with those who say that

technology somehow logically precludes the possibility of human
control.

If this is so, Feinberg's position is significantly

different from Dewey's.

He is arguing that there is something about

technology (or about human nature) that prevents its management in
the interest of humane social relationships.

If so, it would be

important to hear more specifically his grounds for this position,
and how a decision could be made to extricate technology from the

Feinberg does not discuss any alternative to

culture we now have.

technology, or what the implications of his criticism of Dewey on
this subject might be.
In Dewey's writing, however, it is just this view of tech-

nology, as if it were somehow independent of human choice and decision
that he wished to change.

In a chapter entitled "Labor and Leisure

in Democracy and Education

the separation of intelligence and moral

conviction from labor is characterized as "the Aristotelian view'

of

labor, and as reflecting a long-established distinction in status

work
between social groups who work with their hands and those who

with their heads.

It is a major aim of Dewey in his social theory

well as all industrial
to overcome that distinction by making labor as

application of the
activity become an expression of the intelligent

highest values of humanity.

In this sense,

(i.e.

technology as the

physical activity) Feinberg
combination of intelligent morality and

.
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was correct in saying, "Technology, as Dewey expressed it,
was the
1^8®®

j

the principle around which all other relations were now

to be ordered."

The statement by Feinberg is not true, however,

if it is understood to mean that industrial activity for private

profit is the new logos.

...

On the contrary, Dewey maintained

that "Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of

departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to
assume and perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses.

The testing movement.

" 18
.

.

Dewey did not object to the division of labor

because he understood the practice as a symptom rather than a cause
of social inequality.

He was more concerned to restore democratic

practices such as worker participation in decision-making processes.

Division of labor could be a cooperative practice and a mutually

beneficial one rather than an exploitative one under more democratic
circumstances
Feinberg refers to Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow to show that

where white middle class children were concerned, Dewey was eager to
have Progressive education train them for the more sophisticated
skills being required for management level jobs. At the same time,
that
says Feinberg, he was content to have blacks trained in skills

kept them at the level of menial workers.

Feinberg draws this

but
conclusion not from anything Dewey says in Schools of Tomorrow^

from what he does not say.

Dewey is attacked for not taking the
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occasion of his description of a black school as an opportunity
to
comment on the race problem in education.
no discussion in Dewey's writings

It is true that there is

about racial discrimination in

education, but his position on the issue was clear.

In his article

Racial Prejudice and Friction it is clear that he regards racial

prejudice as "a deep-seated and widespread social disease.
Nevertheless, he says that frequently racial prejudice is discussed
in an atmosphere of moral indignation without a corresponding desire
to deal intelligently or to take assertive action on the issue.

In

this article he examines institutional relationships which are

responsible for racial discrimination, and proposes support for
immigration control until countries can deal with the internal political and economic arrangements which would be necessary to reduce

tension between races.

It is not true, as Feinberg suggests, that

Dewey supported discriminatory practices or favored the continued

subjugation of minority groups to the economic interests of the
white middle class.

Equal opportunity.

Feinberg argued that the liberal ideal of

equality of opportunity arose out of two sources: a concern for

justice and a concern to provide trained labor for industrial
technology.

The concern for justice was that individuals should be

race,
allowed to enjoy economic achievement without hinderance from

religion, or social class.

The second concern was that the source
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of that economic achievement, employment in the
economic sector, be

protected and encouraged.

According to Feinberg, liberals saw no

contradiction between the schools' role as serving individuals'
desire for personal growth and economic advancement, and their service
to technology.

In fact, he says, there was a contradiction, and it

became evident in the way justice was sacrificed in the treatment
of individuals who belonged to minority groups.

As evidence he cites

the treatment of blacks in Dewey's book. Schools of Tomorrow

,

Dewey's

study of the Polish community in Philadelphia, and an account of the

Bureau of Intercultural Education in Detroit.
The major point Feinberg makes in this connection is that

there is an inconsistency between Dewey's concepts of community and
technology.
end,

While technology has efficient production of goods as its

the ideal of a democratic community has justice as its end.

The

two inevitably come into conflict, and then, Feinberg says, Dewey

understands technology as the given to which justice must yield.
This dialectical posing of the problem is not an accurate

representation of Dewey's view.

Neither of the two principal terms

holds the absolute and mutually exclusive character for Dewey that

Feinberg gives to them.

Dewey is clear that human community is the

end, and that technology, in the sense of the application of both the

method and product of science to human interaction, is the means.

Industrial technology is not an end for Dewey.

He states in numerous

.
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places that the domination of technology over social institutions
is an historical consequence of human failure to accept responsibil-

ity for shaping social institutions, not a logical consequence.

20

The evidence from Dewey's work does not confirm Feinberg's

interpretation.

First, the mere absence of a protest against racial

discrimination in connection with the black school in Indianapolis,
cannot be counted as evidence that Dewey was willing to compromise

justice in schooling for the sake of supplying industrial labor.
Dewey says in this connection.
Mr. Valentine’s school is located in the poor, crowded, colored
district of the city and has only colored pupils. It is not
an attempt to solve "the race question", nor yet an experiment
Yet the success of the
.
suited only to colored people.
experiment would mean a real step forward in solving "the race
quest^^n" and peculiar problems of any immigrant district as
.

well
Dewey recognized the economic roots of racial prejudice and saw the

effectiveness of the school in its ability to improve economic
conditions for its students and thereby to alleviate their vulner.

.
ability to discrimination.
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proposed
Feinberg's reading of the Polish study is that Dewey

which would have
a loyalty test for the Polish American citizens

violated their civil rights.

Since Dewey's real concern, according

labor for technology,
to Feinberg, was to maintain Polish

the

sacrifice the demands of
report shows that Dewey was willing to

justice for the interest of technology.

Such a reading of the Polish
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study is contrived, however.

In fact, the study is an example of

Dewey's concern for supporting the interests of democratic government
among the Polish people both in America and in Europe.

A conserva-

tive, anti-democratic group related to former monarchists had

managed to secure the support of the British, French, and United
States governments, and to set up a committee in Paris as a government in exile.

Its agent in America was the Polish musician,

Paderewski, living in Philadelphia.

The Polish American community

at the time Dewey made his Polish study was in the midst of a power

struggle between the Paris committee and the representatives of a

socialist democratic group, the K.O.N.. Dewey believed that both

Polish Americans and Europeans would benefit from the success of the
K.O.N. and worked to get the United States government to favor the

more democratic group.

What Feinberg called the loyalty test, which

supposedly would have violated the civil rights of the Poles, was
a proposal for an American commission to supervise funds and

publications in the Polish community in the light of widely

acknowledged abuse.

Feinberg uses the material in the Polish

study to imply that Dewey was more concerned about the service of

Polish labor to American industry than for the civil rights of
Polish Americans.

In fact, Dewey's defense of those who fought

to oppose both
for more democratic control of Polish affairs led him

Polish community.
his own government and elitist control in the

.
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History

Feinberg argues that Dewey formulated a view of history

that rationalized the growth of technology by affirming a notion of

social progress and by describing contemporary American culture as

achieving "the Great Community."

By opposing a traditional view of

history, which stressed the objectivity of historical events,

Dewey legitimized a subjectivistic historiography that concealed the
failure of liberalism to deal with social ills, and created an idealized view of the past, which Americans took for fact.
It is true that Dewey himself wrote little about the study

of history although he included much historical material in his

expository writing.

The secondary work on his views about histori-

ography is also limited.
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Nevertheless, we can say what his views

on the subject were, even if we cannot say what secret ideological

purpose lay behind them.
Dewey's view of history was formulated in connection with

developments in German historical research.

While Dewey objected

to what seemed exaggerated claims to scientific objectivity, he

nevertheless admired the new research techniques, and believed that
they foreshadowed the methodological breakthrough in social science
that had already been achieved in the natural sciences.

While he

continued to stress the role of historical studies in the development
present
of social policy, and to emphasize the degree to which
that histosocial problems shape the perception of the past, he saw
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rical research could serve social policy only if it had a method

which could be trusted to reveal connections between events that

were empirically valid.

Insofar as sound methods of historical

research yielded patterns of continuity that could be independently

confirmed by separate researchers and could claim objective
validity, Dewey favored the use of the method.

His point, however,

was that the meaning of historical events was not isolated from the

significance of those events for social policy, and the historian
had a role to play in policy formation.

25

Feinberg maintains that "the inspirational component of
liberal thought was expressed by a belief in progress that became
the sustaining force behind many proposals for educational change
and social reform.

However, this same belief shielded technology

and the principle of greatest efficiency that guided its growth,

from careful consideration."
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On the contrary, however, Dewey

writes in his article entitled "Progress" that it is precisely the

notion of progress protecting technology that has been exposed and
discredited by the First World War.
We know now that science has not only rendered the enginery of
war more deadly, but has also increased the powers of resistant
endurance when the war comes. If all this does not demonstrate
that the forces which have brought about complicated and
extensive changes in the fabric of society do not of themselves^y
generate progress, I do not know what a demonstration would be.
There does not appear to be anything in Dewey's work that
to impersonal
legitimizes any social policy that subjects individuals
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technological ends.
to prevent.

That is what his view of history was intended

He did not equate America with the realization of a

social utopia, although he had hopes for great social
achievements

which were common in

his day.

His views of history appeared to

offer an instrument to criticize those features of liberalism

Feinberg himself objects to rather than to legitimize them.

Social theory. Feinberg was incorrect in saying that Dewey espoused
a pressure group theory over the Marxist class conflict theory

in order to justify social control by an elitist group.

On the one

hand, there is nowhere in Dewey’s writings where he states such a

motive, and on the other, his work persistently stresses opposition
to elitist control and the urgency of individual participation in

intelligent control over and responsibility for one’s own destiny.
No government by experts in which the masses do not have the
chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything
but an oligarchy managed in the interest of a few. And the
enlightenment must proceed in ways that force the administrative
specialists to take account of the needs. The world has
suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses.

,

If one asks how could Feinberg have gotten such an impression
of Dewey if there were so little grounds for it, Joe Burnett, in a

recent article entitled, ’’John Dewey and the Ploys of Revisionism",

suggests three features of Dewey’s work that could lead to such a

misinterpretation.

First, when Dewey discusses "democracy" he

seems to use the word without the political characteristics normally
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associated with the term, such as majority rule and representative
government.

He believes that groups like the family with parents

dominant, or a professional group with skilled craftsmen dominant,
can be called democratic.

Second, in Dewey’s emphasis on science,

intelligence, and the method of inquiry, it is possible on a few

occasions to interpret him as referring to the body of scientists
as an elite corps whose services are indispensible to social reform.

Third, on some occasions Dewey appears to see education as a

substitute for the kind of authority which would be wielded coercively
in the absence of education.

For example, he says.

The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The
superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular
suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and those
who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic
society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must
find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these
can be created only by education.

Burnett points out that in each of these cases

it

is only a

superficial reading of Dewey that would yield the interpretation that
he was not committed to political democracy or that he favored man-

agement of society by a scientific elite, or that he opposed parti-

cipatory democracy.

A careful reading of the contexts of questionable

passages indicates that Dewey regarded majority rule, for example,
community as its
as the form of democracy, but the ethical concept of
substance.

life
That is, the specific forms of democratic political

the majority or the loss
do not themselves protect from the tyrrany of
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of community.

Political democracy is instrumental to democracy as

an ethical concept, and that is why Dewey gives the unorthodox

definition of democracy stated in Democracy and Education.
While Feinberg attacks Dewey for his failure to emphasize the

political character of this society and its educational system,
Burnett notes that such a criticism overlooks the most basic claim
in Dewey's social theory.

tical Theory of John Dewey

As Sorajee concluded in his study The Poli,

"The political analyst must go beyond

the formal structures of political institutions, and must take into

account the broad social structure within which they function, and

from which they derive their peculiarities."
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The same point is

made by Burnett:
One can see why Dewey might be a bane of political philosophers.
They are apt to criticize him for having no developed theory of
power or domination, and hence, no political philosophy. The
point, however, is that Dewey has a theory of social democracy
to which, given its nature, political philosophy is secondary,
and in a very real sense, from which it is derivitive. One
suspects that they criticize him for not having something as basic
the very nature of the case he wants to argue is not
which
basic.
The priority Dewey gives to the social or ethical concept of
comment
democracy as the ideal community also illuminates Feinberg 's

on "functional integration."

Feinberg argues that Progressive

principles on which
reformers were deliberately unreflective about the
to be used by
their efforts were based, and so allowed themselves

the elite of corporate technology.

"Thus instead of a prolonged
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evaluation of the principles of social organization itself, the
Progressives insisted on evaluating institutions merely on the basis
of their functional integration.”

The fact that Dewey understood

political institutions as secondary to the social concept of idealized
community shows that such a claim is patently untrue of Dewey, as
Burnett notes.

"All of this is sheer error: Dewey flatly refused
33

to make the functional arguments to supplant his principles.”

Principle of equality.

Feinberg advances his proposal for a principle

of equality as opposed to Dewey's principle of equal opportunity on

the grounds that equal opportunity has failed to achieve economic

equality.

Indeed, in revisionist fashion, he infers that reformers

like Dewey never intended to achieve real equality.

Although Feinberg seems to have a quantitative view of what
equality requires, Dewey's view argues that equality is a principle
for resolving social conflict rather than a description of a specific

quantitative distribution of resources at some future time.
article from the New

In an

Republic entitled "Individuality, Equality,

and Superiority,” he noted that the current use of testing in

education aimed at fitting individuals into established economic
classifications.

Ironically this practice was pursued in the name

that democracy
of individualism by those "aristocrats” who believed

has foresaken its traditional concern for individuals.

But Dewey

ideal meaning
wanted to restore what he called "the moral and

of

.
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democracy
It (democracy) denotes faith in individuality, in uniquely distinct
qualities in each normal human being; faith in corresponding
unique modes of activity that create new ends, with willing
acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed
by the release of individualized capacities.

Dewey notes that early advocates of democracy, like John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson, never denied distinctions in natural abilities.

but sought to insure that political procedures actually served the

moral principle of the equality of all.

"Both agreed," said Dewey,

"that equality is moral, a matter of justice socially secured, not of

physical or psychological endowment."
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Since the economic system

tended to grant excessive political power to those with socially

undesirable native abilities, and allowed their success to be
counted as "superiority", it was especially urgent that the distinctly

moral sense of equality be emphasized.

Moral equality cannot be conceived on the basis of legal, political,
and economic arrangements. For all these are bound to be
classif icatory to be concerned with uniformities and statistical
averages. Moral equality means incommensurability, t||
inapplicability of common and qualitative standards.
;

aptitudes
The task of education in a democracy is to cultivate those

individuality of
that reflect the diversity, the uniqueness, and the
its citizens.

moral
Dewey concludes, "The democrat, with his faith in

universal. His
equality, is the representative of aristocracy made
n
1
equality is that of distinction made universal.

37

there appears to be
In view of this understanding of equality,

Dewey's equality of opportunity
no ground for Feinberg to argue that
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as a subtrafuge for social control of workers.

Indeed, Feinberg’s

own proposal appears to be an example of just such a reduction of
the concept of equality to a device of economic classification, and,
as Dewey suggested, to play into the tendency of administrators to

translate worthwhile goals into programs evaluated by quantitative

criteria which defeat the purpose of the original goals.

If

Feinberg's argument is that there must be some point at which

ethical goals materially influence the economic condition of
citizens for the better, Dewey would hardly disagree.

But to

divide education into financially measurable shares to be distributed
in such a way that some require a social obligation of service and

others do not, makes both education and social service into

commodities, and gives education an unnecessarily private significance, and social service the appearance of a penalty.
In general, Feinberg's critique of Dewey suffers from a

failure to distinguish Dewey's own position from that of other
liberals of his time.

It does not acknowledge Dewey's protest

against the pressures of industrialization, and his innovative
efforts to build a conceptual framework from which to make many of
theme
the same criticisms that Feinberg would like to make. The
of Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy

,

for example, calling for

philosophical
the inclusion of a moral perspective in scientific and
Feinberg's work.
thinking, is not far at all from the major themes of
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While it may be true that Dewey did not envision the concentrations
of wealth and power of the nineteen seventies and the problems that

would be raised for the kind of democratic life he had hoped for,
his work did not pretend to anticipate or to minimize the difficulty

of moral decisions that would have to be made later.

The construc-

tive value of Feinberg’s work lies less in his critique of Dewey
than in his underscoring of the urgency of Dewey’s vision of

industrial democracy in an era when individual participation in

social decision-making seems to be more and more remote.

:

CHAPTER

IV

BOWLES AND GINTIS

SCHOOLING AS THE REPRODUCTION OF THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CAPITALISM

Introduction
In 1973 Bowles and Gintis presented a paper at the Institute

for open education on the topic of John Dewey and liberal educational

reform.

Much of the same material was published in their article

"The Contradictions of Liberal Educational Reform" in Work, Technology

and Education in 1975, and in chapter two of Schooling in Capitalist
1

America in 1976.

Although they have modified many of their views

in response to criticism provoked by their works, nothing has

appeared in print to indicate that their understanding of Dewey and
his relation to liberal educational reform has changed.
No distinction is made in their work between education and

schooling.

The two are understood interchangeably as what occurs

in public schools which are under the hierarchical control of

bureaucratic officials, who are themselves controlled by members of
an economic elite.

The school system operates in the interest of

labor
creating, at the lower levels, a pool of minimally skilled

which serves to keep wages low by creating surplus labor.

At

to sort out in
higher educational levels, the school system serves

with more sophisticated
an arbitrary manner labor which is equipped
77
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skills, but still is subservient to the needs of the capitalist

elite for employees who take a minimal share of the profits.

Their major claim is that education is a process reproducing
the social relations of capitalism.

That is, while educators in the

twentieth century had tended to understand schooling as training
in cognitive skills

,

and have rationalized unequal economic achieve-

ment by saying that it reflected an inequality in the natural or

genetic endowment of the students,

in fact, schooling performed

its major function through the "hidden curriculum" by training

children in the social attitudes and values of subservient labor.
The split between the influence of schooling on the cognitive
and affective development of children is related in the view of

Bowles and Gintis to the breakdown of the liberal theory of
schooling.

In Bowles and Gintis' view the movement for compulsory

public schooling corresponded with the growth of factories in the
twentieth century.

Compulsory schooling was instituted on the

would
basis of the promise from educators that the skills students
mobility. A further
acquire would provide assurance of upward economic
part of the
major expansion of schooling came in the latter

nineteenth a

rd

of
early twentieth century when the development

labor and the
corporate capitalism required more sophisticated
is at present being
secondary school movement flourished. Education

structure of capitalism,
transformed by a third change in the economic

"proletarianization
which Bowles and Gintis identify as the

of the

.
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professional class, reflected in vocational education in college
level programs

Liberal approaches to education are characterized by the

tendency to adapt educational beliefs and practices to the needs
of the capitalist economic system.

The technique of regarding

schooling in terms of cognitive skills which are measurable through
I.Q. tests was an attempt to legitimize economic inequalities

realized by students after schooling by categorizing children
according to cognitive skills and by claiming that those with

greater skills deserve more rewards than those with less.

At the

same time, the inculcation of submission to authority was the

major economic function of schooling, although that was not
acknowledged by liberal educators, except as a regrettable flaw
in the existing system.

The subject of attack

.

While Bowles and Gintis do not summarize

Dewey's argument in their article, it seems useful to do so despite
its familiarity.

Dewey begins with a series of definitions which

to avoid
are conspicuous for their generality, and which attempt

controversial questions.

For example, by "society" he means all

related
people regarded collectively, living in a community of
regard to
interdependent individuals, or any such subgroup, without

totalitarian,
whether it is capitalist or socialist, democratic or
etc.

.

values, skills,
By "culture" he means all ideas, attitudes,
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and dispositions, as well as the artifacts of these, which enable

people to survive in a physical environment

,

without regard to

whether the arrangement is hierarchical or egalitarian, alienated
or not, etc..

He further defines "natural environment" as the

physical world in the most general sense, assuming that it is at
least minimally receptive to human influence and direction, but

without foreclosing the question of whether it is either ultimately
subject to supernatural or trans-historical forces or chaotic. He

believes that order in social affairs is a product of the inter-

action of intelligent human activity and the non-human physical
world.

"Growth," he understands as the continuous reconstruction

of experience as well as physical maturation, without regard to

whether it is internal or external, intrinsic or extrinsic. Indeed,
he would regard both sets of terms as misleading when applied to
the concept of growth.

Personal growth cannot be distinguished from

social growth in any significant way.
His general argument runs as follows: society relies on the

communication of culture to each succeeding generation for its
survival in its physical environment.

"Education

stands for the

transmission of culture from the dying to the rising generation.
"Schooling" is the form of education that occurs when a culture

becomes literate and requires a social structure consciously
devoted to education in a systematic manner.

Therefore, there is

society without
no society without education and no literate
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schooling.
In the case of some societies there is evidence of a

continuous development of the ability to survive more effectively
by adapting to increasingly complex features of the environment.

Societies which employ authoritarian methods of education and maintain
rigidly stratified social divisions do not show such development.

When the development does occur, it is attributable to a type of
social arrangement he calls "democratic": i.e. a form of social

organization which reflects a continuous expansion of interests held
in common between individucil members and increasing interaction and

cooperative intercourse between social groups.
It follows then that if social development is the aim of a

society, its education must be democratic.

It is important to note

that the democratic character of education is contingent, not

necessary, from a logical point of view.

Education is entitled to

be called democratic when its focus is on continuous reconstruction
of experience to increase the recognized meaning or social content,

and to increase the capacity of individuals to act as the directive

guardians of this reorganization.

Reflective thinking as the method

of reconstructing experience is the aim of education, and growth

defined in this way is its only aim.

Schooling is a necessary

social institution if the aim of society is development, in order to

achieve the deliberate, systematic, and continued cultivation of

.
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this capacity in the members of society.

Dewey was committed to the implementation of his theory of
education.

He argued that present limitations exist to the

realization of such a type of education.

The major limitation is

that society is divided into rival groups competing for political

control over eachother.

Resistance to his proposed unification of

social effort "springs from the notion that experience consists of
a variety of segregated domains or interests, each having its own

independent value, material, and method, each checking every other,
and when each is kept properly bounded by the others

,

they form a

2

kind of 'balance of powers' in education."

These domains, however,

he believes are imaginary, and are caused by the division of society
into more or less rigidly marked off classes or groups in obstruction

of full and flexible interaction and intercourse.

Dewey believed

that such social divisions could and would be modified progressively

by a program of democratic education in schools.

The unspoken con-

dition, however, was the continued committment to democratic social
ends

Bowles' and Gintis' criticism.

empirically or conceptually.

Such a theory could be attacked

When Bowles and Gintis presented the

Education in
same paper mentioned above at the Institute for Open
Dewey Calls,
August of 1973, the title of their lecture was "If John

Tell Him Things Didn't Work Out."

This title, at least, implies the
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empirical criticism by suggesting that the theory
may have been
correct, but that it was not verified by its consequences.

A

consciously conceptual criticism, however, might argue either
that
the principal terms of the argument were not working
definitions

because they were arbitrary or differed in meaning from the same
terms describing the consequences predicted, or that the premises of
the argviment were contradictory.

the latter argument while in fact,

Bowles and Gintis claim to make
I

suggest, they are making the

former.

Their criticism runs as follows.

Dewey's argument is vulner-

able conceptually because the functions of schooling are contradictory, and empirically because schools do not have the power to

perform the functions assigned to them.
According to Dewey, they argue, schools have three functions:
1)

to produce the kind of individuals capable and willing to staff

the various occupational, political, and other adult roles required
by an expanding economy and stable polity, 2) to equalize social
to promote the psychic and moral development of

opportunity, and

3)

the individual.

Although Dewey sees these functions as logically

interdependent, they argue, in fact they are not, for the following
reasons.

In view of the fact that American society has managed

to survive and grow,

at least economically, there can be no denial

that function 1) has been fulfilled.

On the other hand, they argue
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that there has been abundant empirical evidence that conditions two

and three have not been fulfilled.

They offer various sorts of

evidence to suggest that education has not equalized the distribution
of economic resources among the population, but has served to

concentrate them in fewer hands according to established class
privilege.

Further, they cite reports which serve to indicate that

education has become more authoritarian and repressive, and hence
less concerned with promoting the psychic and personal growth of

students.

The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that

at the very least the three fxinctions of schooling given by Dewey are

not reciprocally necessary, and have no necessary logical connection.
The stronger claim is what Bowles and Gintis would really like to
show: mainly, that the functions are actually contradictory.

We will go much further and assert that the way in which the
school system performs its expanded reproduction function
through its production of a labor force for the capitalist
enterprise
is inconsistent with its performance of either
the self-development or the equality of opportunity function.
Under corporate capitalism, the correspondence between the
social relations of production and the social relations of
reproduction
the essential mechanism of the expanded
precludes an egalitarian,
reproduction function of schooling
humane education under corporate capitalism.
The failures of the school system to serve the individual
needs for personal self-development and its poor showing as
a promoter of equal opportunity are thus not the results of
errors in practice but rather flow directly from a fundamental
theoretical error, namely, the contradictory nature of the
objectives of liberal educational reform.
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In order to demonstrate the stronger of the two possible

conclusions suggested above, they argue that capitalist economics
relies on a systematic social organization designed to produce an

adequate labor force and ultimately to reproduce itself.

To do so

it requires an educational system which will instill those attitudes,

values, beliefs, personality traits, and patterns of motivation which

induce adequate performance in the hierarchical division of labor.
These characteristics, however, are not conducive to a healthy

psychic development or personal liberation.

Therefore, if schools

promote "the intrinsic needs of individuals for growth", as mature
adults the students will not find a place in the labor market. And
conversely, if personal growth (as Bowles and Gintis understand it)
is not cultivated,

students will stand a better chance to find a

place in the market.

Other liberal theorists, whom Bowles and Gintis call

representatives of "the technocratic" version of liberalism, are
susceptible to the same criticism.

They equate growth with

improvement in cognitive and psycho-motor skills, claiming that
employability.
these skills are rewarded economically by increased

affecting employA detailed examination of non-cognitive criteria
of liberal theory
ability, however, shows that even this adaptation

advanced in cognitive and motor
is not successful, since those most

skills are not in fact proportionately rewarded.

But their modifi-
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cations cannot save Dewey's argument.

Dewey's error lies in characterizing the social system as democratic, whereas in fact the hierarchical division of labor is
profoundly totalitarian. Moreover, his central thesis as to the
"naturality" and intrinsic growth orientation of education is
untrue under capitalism whether it be laissez faire or that of
the corporate liberal.
Dewey's view requires that work be seen
as a natural extension of "play", whereas alienated work in the
corporate capitalist economy is the negation of all intrinsically
motivated activity
including play.
If the reply is made that Dewey knows that the present

economic order is not democratic and that growth in any socially

significant sense is often frustrated, but that there is no reason
to suppose that some movement may not be made in the direction of

democracy, Bowles and Gintis reply that he fails to "locate" the

problem properly.

Dewey is said to attribute the failure of reform

to the poor performance of individuals or to misunderstanding which

is capable of intelligent correction.

But Bowles and Gintis insist

that the problem is "systemic" in the sense that no mere modification
the
short of revolution could enable the present system to operate in

interest of significant personal freedom and growth.
this that
It can only be inferred from such a response as

descriptive terms.
they view "capitalism" in logical rather than

5

logical conditions which are
It seems to refer, rather, to a set of
power and efficient
reflected in a social system of centralized
"In corporate
management, so that It could only be theoretical;

production conform.
capitalist society the social relations of
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by and large to the 'hierarchical division of labor' characterized
by power and control emanating from the top downward through a finely

graduated bureaucratic order."
An assessment of their criticism.

In this article Bowles and Gintis

select from Dewey's writings what appear to be references to three
functions of schooling, translate the references to terms that Dewey
did not, and probably would not, have used, and then claim that the
three functions are contradictory.

The contradiction, however, is

mot in Dewey's work but in their translation.

From the summary of Dewey's argument above, it is clear that
what they have selected are not functions of schooling but of
society itself, of which the economic system is only a part.

School-

ing is formal education related to a level of culture reflected by
the development of literacy.

Its functions as stated by Dewey were

to simplify, purify, and to balance the cultural heritage in such a

way as to minimize the adverse effects of social divisions.

No attempt

is made to show that these functions which Dewey assigned to schooling

are contradictory.

Education is distinguished from schooling by Dewey as being

incidental or informal in the sense that it is the transmission of
culture not as an intentional act but as a bi-product of activity

pursued for other reasons.

He looked forward to a day when all social

institutions may come to recognize the overriding importance of the
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educational significance of their activity.
Nevertheless, he was clear that at present the major part of

education seemed to happen without a conscious agent either personal
or corporate.

"Schooling" is intentional but its functions are

much more limited.
"Functions"

,

however, cannot be treated as purposes.

The term

"capitalism" is used by Bowles and Gintis to imply not only a function
but a conscious purpose, as if there were some organized group

directing activities in the interest of its own profit and social
At the same time "capitalism" is used as a term equivalent

control.

to Dewey's "society".

Just as the existence of society is assumed

to be an end in itself, and education is its transmission through

time, capitalism is represented as a self-perpetuating agency with

an educational system of social reproduction assuring its survival

through time.

Dewey uses the term "democratic" to describe the characteristics of a society which is expanding in the sense of extending the

benefits of more varied and supportive social relationships to a
greater share of its members.

Bowles and Gintis, however, equate that

function of expanded reproduction of society with the expanded

reproduction of capitalist economy.

It is because of this change of

function of
definition that they can argue that the integrative

schooling

economy
as integrating students into the capitalist

.

.
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rather than into democratic society

is contradictory to personal

development
Peter Clecak, in reviewing Diane Ravitch's criticism of

"reproduction" in Bowles and Gintis, says, "Ravitch assumes a

mechanical and simplistic reading of Marxian notions of 'reproduction';
she implies that the social order of capitalism simply copies itself
as if it were a series of photographs.

Nor serious Marxist makes

such an assumption about change under capitalism

although Bowles

and Gintis, it should be admitted, do write amateurishly about

reproduction
As far as the article under consideration here is concerned,

there does not seem to be adequate reason given to equate Dewey's
use of the term "society" with Bowles' and Gintis' "capitalism."

Dewey's is a broader concept intended to describe patterns of cultural

behavior rather than economic patterns of "capitalism."

Dewey

explicitly distinguishes between societies that reproduce themselves
capitalism does
in a static form, as Bowles and Gintis seem to think
(cf.

"photographically"), from societies that do so in a democratically

developing way.

Dewey's argument makes no connection between

transmission of
democratic principles or personal growth and the
societies that are unlike
static societies, but it is precisely those

whom democratic education
capitalism in Bowles' and Gintis' version for
becomes a logical demand.

of
It appears then that the translation
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Dewey

s

concept of "society" transmitting across generations
a

growing capacity to adapt to more complex environments
through

democratic education, into Bowles’ and Gintis’ "corporate capitalism",

reproducing itself through the social relations of production is
hardly an accurate equasion and provides no basis on which to attack
Dewey’s argument on the function of education.

A similar point is made in Robert Heilbronner
of Schooling in Capitalist America

.

’

s

critique

He notes that while Bowles and

Gintis argue that "the economy produces people,"

that notion is a

"crucial weakness" of the book.
The weakness is that the economy does not produce people. It
produces food and clothing, entertainments and weapons. It is
society that produces clothes and people, and society is a
larger and vastly more complex concept than the economy. The
failure adequately to separate one from another is the most
serious deficiency of Bowles's and Gintis’ s analysis, a
deficiency that lessens the cogency of their criticism of
’capitalist' education and that vitiates their contention about
the possibilities of education in a socialist setting.
’

’

He observes that additional factors in society which the hypothesis

does not take into account are the democratic liberal polity of the

country and the social structure of bourgeois values. Heilbronner
suggests that rather than see education as the passive instrument
of a monolithic capitalism, as Bowles and Gintis seem to do, it could
be regarded as the mediator between the demands of the economy, polity,

and society.

With respect to the second function of schooling, equalization

.

91

of opportunity, none of the passages in Dewey quoted by Bowles and

Gintis refer to schooling as having the function of promoting

equalization of opportunity for economic development.

All of those

passages discuss equalization in social terms including economic
equality but certainly including a wider range of activities than

merely economic.

To interpret equalization of economic opportunity

as what Dewey meant by the aim of schooling being "to provide

something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young"
seems again to be a reduction of what is said to terms that are not
.

equivalent

9

The third "function" of schooling stated by Bowles and Gintis

was referred to variously as "personal" or "self-development",
"healthy psychic development or personal liberation," something that
satisfies "the intrinsic needs of the individual," or "the intrinsic

needs of the individual for growth."

While Dewey may have used these

his
words in one context or another, together they do not reflect

view of the individual or growth.

As a matter of fact, they reflect

sense.
the view that he attacked as alienated in his own

He plainly

from social
Insisted that there is no self-development apart

understood as
development, and certainly nothing that could be

"intrinsic" needs apart from "extrinsic."

What significance Dewey

not clear, except that it is
would attach to "personal liberation" is
from social liberation.
certain that it could not be separated
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Bowles and Gintis have proposed, then, three "functions” for

schooling which are different from the concepts cited in Dewey's

writings as their counterparts.

To the extent that there is a

contradiction, it lies in the way Bowles and Gintis have defined

capitalism as a system which cannot by definition serve a legitimate
interest of the laborer.
Dewey distinguished between education as informal and schooling as formal transmission of culture.

He acknowledged the vastly

greater influence of informal education, although he continued in
most of his educational writings to use the terms education and

schooling interchangeably.

He assumed that the institution of

schooling could be both funded by available political mechanisms
and yet remain independent enough of political control to maintain

Perhaps the most poignant pages of

valid educational aims.
Democracy and Education

,

however, are the last two in the chapter

entitled "The Democratic Conception of Education" in which he noted
that schooling alone cannot effect social reform.

He recognized

that the admirable aims of eighteenth century cosmopolitanism could

not be achieved without sponsorship by some political agency.

Nine-

teenth century nationalism accepted the task only to subvert the

cosmopolitan goals.

But this left genuine education_in the sense of

with the
education committed to personal growth and social growth
partisan
dilemma of affirming the broadest social aims and requiring

93

political support for itself as a social program.
(for it is nothing less)

"This contradiction

between the widest sphere of associated and

mutually helpful social life, and the narrower sphere of exclusive
and potentially hostile pursuits and purposes exacts of educational

theory a clearer conception of the meaning of ’social' as a function
and test of education than has yet been attained.

.

.

The ideal may

seem remote of execution, but the democratic ideal of education is a
farcical, yet tragic delusion, except as the ideal more and more

dominates our public system of education.

It is this clearer

conception of "social" that he pursued in his work on social theory
in the 1920s and 1930s.

One may infer that since the social aim of genuine education
is larger than national,

there ought to be an international agency

of administration which could transcend nationalistic divisions and

protect education from partisan interests.

In The Public an d Its

Problems Dewey did recognize the growing influence of mass communiwhich
cations and identified an international cultural order on

educational values were to be based.
order was "the Great Community."

His term for this international

He did not, however, discuss the

related to the
implications of the international economic system

Great Community.
what education
Dewey has proposed, then, a conception of
and left open the question
could be in terms of cosmopolitan values,

of how such a conception may be institutionalized in a form of

schooling.

His pragmatic suggestions for a "new education" were not

meant to foreclose the question of how such a conception could be

realized in terms of the social, political, and economic realities
of his or any future era.

But he was convinced that the problem was

not too great for popular intelligence to solve.
As Joseph Feathers tone points out, however, Bowles and Gintis
are much closer to Dewey in one respect than other revisionists.^^
It is in their emphasis on schooling as reproducing social character.

While other revisionists appear closer to the anarchist tradition
in their rejection of schooling as having a legitimate interest in

shaping social character, Bowles and Gintis reflect an interest

similar to the concerns of nineteenth century educators that schooling
should be an experience that contributes to the creation of a

socially responsible character in

children.

While their work sometimes represents the reproduction of
social character in the schools as the inevitable subjection of free

personalities to a

^jage

labor mentality, and at others as the product

of the conflict between capitalism and opposing social forces, Bowles

and Gintis maintain that schools can and should contribute to the

formation of an autonomous and socially responsible individual
character.

This is why they focus on the early twentieth century

vocational skill
preoccupation of schools with cognitive testing and
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development as a distortion of the legitimate purposes of education.
In this respect they follow Dewey closely as he himself criticized

these developments at the time of their occurrence.
In summary, then, Bowles and Gintis argue from what appears
to be a doctrinnaire Marxist position, that since economic forces

are fundamental to an analysis of social change, Dewey was wrong in

making society rather than the economy basic to his view of education.
They felt justified in substituting "capitalism" for Dewey's concept
of society since to them social relations in general were secondary
to the social relations of production.

Their theory of "reproduction"

was a contribution to our understanding of the relation of education
and the economy, but social relations, even if dependent in some

sense on economic relations, are not identical with them.
In response to criticism of their work, Bowles and Gintis

appear to have modified their position in some respects.

They

disclaim, for example, a functionalist analysis of schooling, or
that there is any capitalist elite controling the actual outcome of

schooling.

They now regard education as the arena of conflict in

which various social groups clash and arrive at some balance of class
interests. Although they acknowledge that ethnic, regional, and
that
racial divisions are significant social forces, they maintain

ultimately important
it is the class character of these groups that is
economic resources.
for the redistribution of political power and
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They admit that there are strong pressures for more democratic

political arrangements that often come from representatives of
priviledged classes like themselves.
In this shift of position from orthodox Marxism to a more

descriptive empirical analysis of education, they are acknowledging
a diversity of actual functions of schooling, and modifying their

prescriptive judgments about the direction of educational change.
For example, in discussing economic development in the Third World

nations, they do not seem to regard the integrative function of

schooling as contradictory to the aims of democratic equality, but
as factors to be balanced against one another very much as Dewey did

in his Democracy and Education

.

The implication seems to be that

their analysis of schooling as reproduction of the social relations
of production is a contribution to the democratic forces resisting

capitalism if, once the fact is exposed to public view, the power
of the elite to use schools for that end is weakened.

Dewey viewed

himself as making the same kind of contribution to his generation.
But Bowles and Gintis, in their analysis of him as a representative
of classical liberalism, have mistaken an ally for an enemy.

CHAPTER

V

JOHN DEWEY'S LIBERALISM AND THE REVISIONIST CRITIQUE

Introduction
The revisionists' attack on Dewey is based on their view of him
as a spokesman of liberalism.

They view liberalism as a political

ideology responsible for many objectionable contemporary social
conditions, including the undemocratic character of public schooling.
They maintain also that Dewey's educational writings were to some

extent responsible for the plight of schooling, just as his social

views were responsible for the failure of contemporary political
reform.

It is appropriate then to ask whether revisionists are

correct in their analysis of Dewey's views, and whether their

criticisms are directed at issues that he himself would have regarded
as central for his own social philosophy.

Insofar as Dewey took for himself the- title of liberal, and

intended to address the issue of the moral significance of politics,
economics, and education, it does seem that the revisionists are

addressing a primary concern of his social philosophy.

There is an

implication in revisionist writers, however, that in the light of
must be in
the decline of liberalism today, the source of the decline
like Dewey.
the self-contradictory views of earlier liberal thinkers
to the circumDewey's views, of course, were formulated in response
in their own
stances of his own time, and can be evaluated only
97
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context.

How they are used in some later context is a matter of the

motives and interpretation of others.

It may be asked whether there

was ever a similarity of circumstances of his day that threatened
the same decline, and whether he recognized and responded to that

possibility in his analysis of liberalism.

Although his revisionist

critics suggest that there were similar issues that he responded
to in a conservative manner,

focusing as they do on his early writings

and on references taken without attention to his general social theory,
an overview of his work on social philosophy from 1927 to 1939 when he

did his major work on the subject shows that his formulation of

liberalism was directed principally against the conditions of class
conflict and economic inequality that are the concern of the

revisionists
"Liberalism**

There is some ambiguity in the way the term **liberalism** has

been used.
types

.

Most writers on the subject recognize at least two major

Some commentators like Guido de Ruggiero say that when

to
liberalism succeeded in achieving political power, it was forced

from the
change its character to confront those who challenged it
2

lower levels of the political order.

Hence, a more conservative

idealistic type.
variety developed in contrast to an earlier more
Others, like

that
Vernon Farrington, see varieties of liberalism

emphasize conflicting values like laissez faire

liberalism, seeking
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economic freedom, and a Rousseauesque variety, emphasizing egalitarian
democracy for the economically oppressed.

Dewey also understood liberalism as derived from two historical
traditions.

The first he called the religious, humanitarian tradition

in England, which sought social reform

factory workers and the urban poor.

to improve the welfare of the

The second tradition was that of

promoting the growth of industry and trade, as based on the ideas of

Adam Smith, and referred to as laissez faire liberalism.
From the very beginning, Dewey argues, there was an "inner split"
in liberalism.

government help,

While the humanitarians were not averse to seeking
the laissez faire

government activities.

group sought restriction of

While on the European continent the latter

variety of liberalism flourished, in the United States liberalism was

dominated by the humanitarian type.

The Progressive movement in

principle at least was so motivated in promoting numerous pieces of
social legislation.

Other liberals labeled these efforts "radical" or

"communist", but Dewey himself saw nothing revolutionary in the past

history of liberalism.

He claimed.

As a matter of fact, up to this time (1935) in this country political
liberalism has never attempted to change the fundamental conditions
of the economic system, or to do more than ameliorate the estate
For this reason, liberalism
in which the mass of human beings exist.
from
at present is under more violent attack from radicals than
of
term
a
In the mouth of radicals, liberalism is
conservatives.
hissing and reproach.^
fault in Dewey
The conservative character of liberalism, then, is a

s
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view.

Radicals failed to appreciate an important difference in the

meaning of "liberty" for the two branches of liberalism.

The laissez

faire liberals meant by liberty the freedom of the individual to rise
to the top of the economic system as it then existed.

The humanitarian

branch argues "that liberty is something that affects every aspect and
phase of human life

opportunity,

liberty of thought, of expression, of cultural

and that it is not to be had, even in the economic

sphere, without a degree of security that is denied to millions by the

present economic system."^
The future of liberalism for Dewey was in doubt because it had

not responded to the more radical demands for economic justice.

There is, accordingly, no doubt in my own mind that laissez faire
liberalism is played out, largely because of the fruits of its
own policies. Any system that cannot provide elementary security
for millions has no claim to the title of being organized in
behalf of liberty and the development of individuals.
His perception at this time (1935) was that if "humane liberalism"

were to survive at all, it would have to deal seriously with the

means of attainment of social reform.

"At present those means lie

in the direction of increased social control and increased collec-

tivism of effort.

.

.

liberalism must become radical in the sense

that instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil conse-

quences of the social system, it shall use social power to change
the system."^

.
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The term "social power", of course, raises the question of

political power and the radical claim that political violence is the
exercise of that "social Power".

Yet, Dewey argues, "Liberalism,

both by its history and by its own nature, is committed to democratic
methods of effecting social change."
forced to be free.

g

He contends that men cannot be

Violent revolution is a short-cut that would be

self defeating of democratic ends, as he argues it has been in Russia

and Italy.

"Liberty is the means as well as the goal, and (that)

only through the development of individuals in their own voluntary

cooperation with one another can the development of individuality be
m9
made secure and enduring."

There is a connection in Dewey's view between humane liberalism
and radicalism.

Laissez faire liberalism, he says, thinks of

economic structures as if they were natural laws, as though the
existing economic system were only something to be accommodated and
not changed.

By contrast humane liberalism is committed to the idea

concepts of the
of "historic relativity" in that it regards both the
as
individual and society, and its social and economic structures,

in transition.

"Experimentalism" is the method that humane liberalism

direction
recommends to guide the transformation in an appropriate
concepts and social
through continuous reconstruction of existing

relations

.
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It follows (finally) that there is no opposition in principle
between liberalism as a social philosophy and radicalism in
action, if by radicalism we signify the adoption of policies which
bring about drastic instead of piecemeal changes.
These
changes have been so tremendous in the last century, yes, in
the last forty years, that it looks to me as though radical
methods were now necessary. 10
.

.

Nevertheless, since liberalism is concerned with the intelligent

formation and execution of social policies, it opposes those forms
of radicalism that suggest violent overthrow of existing institutions.

With respect to the radicalism of Mussolini and Marx, he argues,
"In the degree in which mere force is resorted to, actual consequences

are themselves so compromised that the ends originally in view have
in fact to be worked out afterward by the method of experimental

intelligence
At the same time Dewey is not blind to the use of force by
others than the radicals, nor was he unaware of schools as coercive

institutions in their effect on the young.

"I do not wish to be

understood as meaning that radicals of the type mentioned have
any monopoly on the use of force.

The contrary is the case.

The

the
reactionaries are in possession of force not only in the army and

police, but in the press and the schools.

Therefore the end of

economic state
humane liberalism was to emphasize the relation of "the

resources to the whole
of affairs to the extension of cultural
change in the
population" and to urge more urgent and intelligent

economic order to promote cultural equality.
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A conspicuous feature of Dewey’s treatment of liberalism
was
his care with terminology and his concern to examine and
.redefine
the terms of his argument that could lead to self-contradiction.
It is a failure to note these redefinitions and distinctions that

seems to lead to much of the innacuracy of revisionist criticism of
him.

For example, a major redefinition of Dewey's has to do with

individuality and common good or general welfare.

While traditional

understanding tends to define these terms as polar opposites, Dewey
argues that ideas such

as common or general need

do not mean a sacrifice of individuality; it would be a poor
kind of society where members are personally underdeveloped.
It does not mean the submergence of what is distinctive, unique,
in different human beings;
such submergence would produce an
impoverishment of the social whole.
Its proper analogue is
not a physical division, but taking part in a game or conversaIt involves diversification,
tion, in a drama, in family life.
not sameness and repetition.
It is this possibility, of building social arrangements that could

enhance individual growth and satisfaction that does not seem to
have been addressed by his revisionist critics, except to dismiss it
as empty rhetoric.

A further clarification is made with respect
equality.

to the idea of

Just as Dewey suggests that democracy has been reduced in

much of the discussion to a procedural concept from a moral one, he
moral
claims that equality is not an economic concept as much as a

.
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one
It does not mean sameness; it is not to be understood quantitatively, an interpretation which always ends in ideas of
external and mechanical equality.
When there is an equation
in his own life and experience between what he contributes to
the group activity and experience and what he receives in
return, in the way of stimulus and enrichment of experience,
he is morally equal.
Each individual is incommensurable
as an individual with every other in that it is impossible to
find an external measure of equality.
.

.

.

.

This is not to argue against economic equality, but to put it into
a larger context.

Economic equality is a question not only of

monetary resources but cultural and social resources.
As far as political and economic equality is concerned, first

Dewey observed that "Most political issues of the present arise
out of economic conditions.

They have to do with the distribution

of wealth and income, the ownership and control of property."

Since

this is so, the first step in remedying the situation is to publicize
the true nature of the case. "The recognition by the general public

theory
of their central position (i.e. economic issues) in political
of
and action would clear the air and make honest differences

conviction more to the point and more fruitful."
discussed under
His concern for equality in economic terms was

Distribution" in his Ethi cs.
a section headed "Four Theories of Just
and views of
There he acknowledged and rejected existing methods

statistical evidence
redistribution of wealth and, citing contemporary
for an allotment to every
for unequal distribution of income, calls
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citizen beyond mere subsistence levels with incentives for public
service.

Public schools have made education available to everyone

without giving "superior advantages to members of certain social or
economic classes", he believed.

So, he reasoned,

"if we should apply

the same principle to economic distribution, it would insist upon a

minimum that would not only prevent actual starvation, but would in
any country of abundant wealth make possible the necessities and some
of the comforts of present civilization."^^

Such redistribution

was not to leave the wealthy in possession of a disproportionate share,
however.

He insisted that "the principle that every man who receives

should make a contribution is fundamental.

.

In discussing the future of capitalism he says that Russia and

Italy were the first major attempts to move beyond capitalist

political economy.

Both seem to have sacrificed a great deal of

individual liberty, but were worth watching to see if such defects
could be remedied.

Regarding the United States, he says.

The extreme individualism of laissez f aire with competition as
the only regulator of the economic process, has been shown to
The
be no longer tolerable under present conditions.
who
numbers
large
necessities of public welfare, and of the
the
require
are economically in the status of pedestrian,
supremacy of an authority which aims at justice, not merely
but as
as keeping order while the contestants fight it out,
common
revising the rules of a contest in the interest of a
conditions
changed
the
by
necessary
good when this is made
of an economic life.l®
,

.

.

what he called "a
It is true that Dewey did not see beyond

modified capitalism".

produced
He believed that capitalism had
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great wealth, and that it had become important to the people who
lived under that system.

Although the system had notorious deficien-

cies, they were not so great that they could not be corrected.

Dewey’s liberalism consisted notin his support for laissez
f aire

capitalism which he attacked repeatedly, but in his concern for

humane liberalism which he helped to create and whose social

legislation he facilitated.

He saw "capitalism" itself as a

perversion of the economic system which could be corrected.

It is

apparent that he could not conceive of an economic system that was
not capitalist and yet was capable of satisfying the material needs of
the nation’s population.

Nevertheless, it was not the culturally

destructive features of the system that he valued, but its contribution
to social and cultural development.

Sidney Hook reports that there were two respects in which

Dewey included in his own philosophy ideas from the socialist
movement.

One was the controling nature of economic conditions that

brought the United States into World War

I.

The other was that

although he believed prior to 1929 that experimental tinkering with
money, credit, tariffs, regulation of monopolies, etc., might serve
employment,
to provide for the basic needs of citizens for security,

before the
and a decent standard of living; early in 1929, even
inadequate.
market crash, he acknowledged that piecemeal reform was

There must be wholesale economic planning.
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His views of the possibility of social reform through the

reform of schooling changed in a similar way.

Although at first he

thought that changes in educational practice would have reforming

effect on society at large, he later came to see schools as controlled
by institutional relations outside of education.

He says that it is

true that democratic countries have ’’exaggerated the educative office
of a special instrument, the schools.”

19

They were the product of a

divisive individualism and promoted socially destructive attitudes.

Although they had a laudable purpose,
the schools, like other agencies, had been laid hold of by
strong minorities, and used to subvert their own ends. The
studies which have been made of the factors which influence
school administration and instruction in large centers leave
out what was said about the suppressive influence of powerful
minorities.
Schools have been accommodated in a passive way
to existing industrial conditions instead of being employed
to wrest humane culture from them. 20
.

.

Consequently, Dewey did not ultimately conceive of schools as a
source of social reform, except insofar as they may through the

agency of far sighted teachers and administrators, contribute to
the building of attitudes that may accept and even demand changes
in the present social order.

The means of change, however, seem to

be political and economic institutions.

World War

I

and the

Depression were evidence of need for such change.

Revisionist Views of Liberalism
to
As might well be expected, critics of liberalism tend
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characterize it in a way that contrasts more sharply with their own
views.

With a concept as broad and as comprehensive as liberalism,

it is easier to caricature than to do justice to its wide range of

meanings.

The revisionists have presented a more conservative view

of liberalism than is represented by those who actually claim the

title of liberal, and have failed to respond to the liberalism that

was particularly true of Dewey.

Had they been more careful to

respond to the social views that he actually held, they would have
found that his liberalism was not the status, authoritarian, racist,

capitalist version they suggest, but a variety that affirmed many of
the values that they themselves hold.

A look at the recent criticism of liberalism may suggest more
precisely where the problems with liberalism lie, and where in

Dewey to look for the antecedents which the revisionists are concerned
to identify.

Jerome Mileur in his Liberal Tradition in Crisis gives some

historical background for the problems of liberalism today.

21

The

social
great achievement for liberals in political terms was the

legislation of the New Deal era.

It was put together with the

farmers, labor,
coalition of several groups, including Southerners,

blacks, and intellectuals.

The rationale for the coalition was the

articulated in
liberal philosophy that Dewey among others

his

was later critical of the
social and political works, although he

.
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New Deal itself
After the early success of the Roosevelt years, the coalition

broke down, and the character of political liberalism changed. Prior
to the New Deal there was a cooperative relationship between liberalism

and the political left, as exemplified by the good relations between
the New York teachers’ union and the Communist Party.

After the

second World War the United States' reaction against Russia led to
a transformation

of liberalism that drove it toward the right, and

severed its connections with the left.

The political left, Mileur

argues, was suppressed from the time of McCarthy to the Viet Nam war.
But it reemerged as an opponent of liberalism, rather than in its

former role as a collaborator.
It is from the Viet Nam era that the most important criticism

of liberalism comes.

The criticism is that liberalism suppressed

dissent, and cut itself off for two decades from reformist

elements of its own constituency.

It had allied itself with

program
established political and economic arrangements and had no
upheld.
to promote the ideals that it had classically

Because it

gains of those
could not manage to control inflation, the economic

New Deal programs
whom it had raised to middle class status through

were threatened, and they turned conservative.
the revisionist criticisms
It is from this Viet Nam period that
of Dewey arise.

concerned witt
Their criticism, while in some cases
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libertarianism or preserving traditional moral views, is strongly
influenced by the attack on liberalism from the left.

They indict

liberalism for flirting with totalitarianism, abandonning the
popular will, concealing the class struggle, supporting the established economic structure, and incorporating schools in preserving the

status quo.

The revisionists tend to portray Dewey as if he were a liberal
in the sense of the 1940s or 1950s when in fact his liberalism was

far more radical than they would acknowledge.

When they refer to

his more radical positions, it is always by way of a concession, as
if Dewey were vacillating or uncertain of his own views.

In fact,

the revisionists’ espousal of ideological historiography has made

them present a caricature of Dewey not informed by what Dewey said
and did so much as by their own views of liberalism in the 1960s.
It may yet be asked, however, how could liberalism go from

what it was in Dewey's day to what it became in the 1960s.

What was

there in Dewey's thinking that may have foreshadowed the alienation
of the left in later liberalism?

Some light on this issue may be

shed by examining Dewey's treatment of Marx in Freedom and Culture
in which Dewey makes his most extended comments on Marx.
In Freedom and Culture

Dewey attacked Marx and Marxism

the
primarily for claiming to offer a scientific method when in fact

principles derived
theory is a systematic application of metaphysical

Ill

from Hegel.

’*Marx saw in the

Hegelian dialectic a principle which,

when it was given an economic interpretation,
provided a sure basis
for a science of social changes, while at
the same time furnished the

revolutionary movement a supreme directive for its
practical
activities.

22

He regarded this as pre-scientific in its emphasis

on necessity and on a single comprehensive law while
contemporary

science meant acknowledgement of probability and pluralism of
theory.

Marxism, then, could not be reconciled with Dewey's view of the

experimental nature of science.
The theoretical absolutism he saw as more than a methodological
error.

"Absolute principles are intolerant of dissent, for dissent

from 'the truth.' is more than an intellectual error.
an evil and dangerous will."

23

It is proof of

The rejection of democratic procedure

by the Stalinists seemed to him a fulfillment of the Marxist methods
as well as a consequence of the Marxist reduction of psychological

phenomena to economic forces.
The fact is that Marx and every Marxist after Piim unconsciously
assumes the existence and operation of factors in the constitution of human nature which must cooperate with, 'external'
economic or 'material' conditions in producing what actually
Explicit recognition of th^^e factors would give the
happens.
theory a different practical slant.
Two general responses have been made to Dewey's treatment of

Marx and Marxism by Sidney Hook and Jim Cork.

The first is that

Dewey did not distinguish between Marx and Marxism, and his criticism
of Marx is colored strongly by the work of Marxist interpreters of
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Dewey’s own day.

He was especially distressed at Stalin’s policies,

and remained unresponsive to colleagues like Hook who urged him to

reconsider his views of Marx.
The second point made about Dewey’s treatment of Marx is that

an analysis of Marx’s and Dewey’s works indicates that they are both

compatible and complementary.

Hook says:

Leaving aside certain secondary differences of terminology, it
seems to me that were realistic Marxists prepared to submit
their methods of achieving democratic socialism to serious
scientific criticism, and were Dewey prepared to work out a
more detailed program of political action with reference to
the social." and economic relations, their positions would
converge on a set of common hypotheses leading to common
activity.
Later writers like Richard Bernstein in Praxis and Action have
pursued this line of thought, but it seems correct to say that

Dewey did reflect in his treatment of Marx the tendency of liberalism
to separate itself from left wing social theory.

26

Dewey, himself,

however, supported many of the programs for which the leftists worked,
and opposed the so-called liberals who suppressed dissent form the
left.

He campaigned actively for Norman Thomas, the socialist

condidate for president, and opposed the Roosevelt New Deal as not
radical enough.
In summary, the revisionists draw on a view of liberalism

conservative,
taken from the 1940s and 1950s which had become more
for the social
and may legitimately be accused of responsibility

condemned.
problems of the 1960s which the revisionists

Their attack
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on Dewey, however, is based on an error of equating Dewey's liberalism

with that of a later era.

Had they examined his social views in

their historical context, they would have found him much closer to
the position which they hold themselves.

.

.
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APPENDIX
"

I

Industrial Democracy" in Dewey

In a biography of Dewey written in 1939 for Paul Arthur Schilpp's

The Philosophy of John Dewey

,

the authors, Dewey's three daughters,

refer to Dewey's comment about "democracy becoming Industrial".

Referring to the lectures. The Ethics of Democracy,

they say.

The most significant statement in the address, from a present
day point of view, is that political democracy is impossible
without economic and industrial democracy. But this statement
should not be taken to have its present meaning.
Its immediate
source was probably Henry Carter Adams, a colleague in political
economy, who frequently pointed out the desirability and
probability of a development in economic life paralleled to
that which had taken place in politics, from absolutism and oligarchy to popular representation.^
No further comment is made in the biography, and the implication is
that Dewey's comment is not to be taken as an indication that he had

and more detailed views on the subject at this point in his career.
In the context of the statement about democracy becoming industria]

Dewey gives his interpretation of the Platonic idea of government, that
each individual realizes the ideal of his own personal development as
he interacts with the social and political community.

Democracy,

although Plato did not realize it, is the actual working out of this
ethical and political ideal.

Democracy holds that the ideal is already at work in every
.Democracy
personality, and must be trusted to care for itself.
admits
It
reality.
final
and
means that personality is the first
the
by
learned
be
can
that the full significance of personality
objective
in
him
individual only as it is already presented to
encourageform in society; it admits that the chief stimuli and
.
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ment to the realization of personality come from society; but
it holds, none the less, to the fact that personality cannot
be procured for anyone, however degraded and feeble, by
anyone else, however wise and strong. It holds that the spirit
of personality dwells in every individual, and that the choice
to develop it must proceed from the individual.^
This view of social and political institutions having as their

aim the promotion of the growth of individual personality is then
"illustrated” by the notion that "democracy must become industrial,"
or "a democracy of wealth is a necessity."

The objection that is

commonly raised to this idea, says Dewey, is that a simple numerical

division of wealth and redistribution would ne no effective solution.
But he responds that he does not mean the merely numerical division
of wealth.

""What is meant in detail by democracy of wealth,"

he says, "we shall not know until it is more of a reality than it is

today."

At any rate, however, it means that industrial relations be

made subordinate to human relations, "that industrial organization
be made to serve a social function;"

industrial relations "are to

become the material of an ethical realization; the form and substance
of a community of good

(though not necessarily of goods)

,

wider than

and
any now known: that is, the family, largely in its best examples,

purpose
the state somewhat, though in a less degree, mean unity of
interest and
and interest; so economic society must mean unity of

purpose m3
Dewey comments
In a review entitled "Creative Industry" in 1918,

.
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favorably on a book entitled Creative Impulse In Industry: A

Proposition for Educators

by Helen Marot.

She lays chief stress on the importance of such conditions and
methods as will give each student-worker personal experience
in the administrative control of the processes of production
and marketing. Here, as she rightly points out, is the
greatest field for adventure and creative impulse. Only as
the modern society has at its command individuals who are trained
by experience in the control of industrial activities and
relationships, can we achieve industrial democracy, the
autonomous management of each line of productive work by those
directly engaged in it. Without such democratization of
industry, socialization of industry will be doomed to arrest
at the stage of capitalism, which may give the average laborer
a greater share of the material rewards of industry than he
now enjoys, but which will leave him in the same condition
of intellectual and moral passivity and perversion as that
in which he now lives.

Although at several places in his work on ethics Dewey discusses
the importance of economic life for social and political behavior,

he does not describe specific political programs for the implementation

of industrial democracy.

his Ethics

,

In

his 1908 (and 1932 revision) of

he describes, with his co-author Tufts, numerous

"unsolved problems" of industrial capitalism, such as private property, mechanization of industry, labor unions, corporations, etc.,
as well as theories of redistribution of wealth.

he regards as in transition.

All of these topics

He sees his ethical views of industrial

would move
democracy as a set of principles meant to guide those who
of a more socialist
the present political order in the direction

government
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